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PIPEFI TTERS LOCAL 
UNION No. 562 
v. 
UNITED STA TES 
BENCH MEMO 
On Cert to CA 8 
(Matthea, Van Ooaterhout, 
Mehaffy It Gil>eon; Lay, 





( 1) Whether the indictment againat petra alleged an offenae 
and whether the evidence aupported petra' conviction for violating 
Controlling caaea: United Statea v. Auto Workera, 352 U.S. 567 (195~ 
United Statea v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106 (1948) 
International Aaaociation of Machiniata v. Street, 
36 7 U. s. 7 40 ( 1961. 






18 U.S. C. 610, which prohibit• labor union• from making con-
tribution• or expenditure• in connection with federal election•. 
(2) Whether the trial court properly inatructed the jury that 
it would be poaaible to find petra 1uilty of conapirina to violate 
I 610 even if the contributions made to the union political fund 
were voluntary. 
(3) Whether 18 U.S.C. 610, on ita face or aa applied to 
petra, ia unconatitutional aa 
a. abridging firat amendment rights, 
b. impermiaaibly vague and thua denying due proceaa, 
c. diacriminatory a1ainat the labor movement and thua 
violating the equal protection guarantee embodied in the due 
proce•• clause of the fifth amendment, or 
d. violative of voting right• in federal electiona. 
(4) Whether petra' conviction• ahould be set aaide due to in-
conaiatent jury verdicts, the jury havins found that petr■ did not 
willfully violate S 61 O. 
STATUTE INVOLVED 
Section 610, Title 18, U.S. C., provides as follow•: 
It. i• unlawful for any national bank, or any corporation 
organised by authority of any law of Con1res■, to make a con-
tribution or expenditure in connection with any election tD any 
political office, or in couection with any primary election or 
political convention or caucua held to aelect candidate■ for an; 
political office, or for any corporation whatever, ~ any laboi 
or1anisation to make a contribution or expenditure in con-
n~tion with any election at which Preaidential or Vice-





or a Dele1ate or Resident Commiaaioner to Congreaa are to b 
voted for, or in connection with any primary election or 
political convention or caucus held to select candidate• for an~ 
of the fore1oin1 officea, or for any candidate, political 
committee, or other person to accept or receive any con-
tribution prohibited by thia section. 
Every corporation or labor or1aniaation which makes any 
contribution or expenditure in violation of this section shall bt 
fined not more than $5,. 000; and every officer or director of &1 
cor poration, or officer of any labor or1anization, who consent1 
to any contribution or expenditure by the corporation or labor 
organization, a• the case may be, and any peraon who accept1 
or receives any contribution, in violation of thia aection, aha) 
be fined not moze than one year. or both; and if the violation 
waa willful, ahall be fined not more than $10,000 or im-
priaoned not more than two yeara, or both. 
For the purpoae of thia aection 1abor organization' mean a 
any organization of any kind,. or any agency or employee 
repreaentation committee or plan, in which employees par-
ticipate and which exist for the purpose, in whole or in part, 
of dealing with employer• concerning grievances,. labor dis-
putes,. wages,. rate• of pay, hour• of employment, or con-
dition• of work. 
FACTS 
Petra were indicted in the USDC ED Mo for conspiring to vio-
late 18 U.S.C. 610 by having!Dcal 562 (the petr union) make political 
contribution• in connection with certain federal electiona. The in-
dictment char1ed that petra conapired to eatablish and maintain a 
special fund entitled "Pipefittera Voluntary Political, Educational, 
Leaialative,. Charity and Defenae Fund" (the "Fund"), which would be 
pven the appearance of an entity aeparate and apart from the union, 
bu.t which would operate under the control of union official• and would 
collect amount• from union member• and non-union member• worldn1 
within the juriadiction of the union on a per diem baaia. Petra were 
-
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cba_rged with con■pirin1 to u■e the Fund to make aub■tantial con-
tribation■ in the 1964 and 1966 general election campaigns and with 
ia■uing check■ amounting to more than $1S1. 000 for the campaign• 
of varioua federal candidate■• '-
The evidence at trial showed that the Fund collected about 
$1. 230. 986 during the period of the indictment. Contribution■ to the 
Fund were handled much the aame aa general union aaaeaamenta. -
Contributing union member& were '~equired to ■ign a form entitled - \ 
"Voluntary Contribution A1reement." All, or virtually all. union 
' 
members signed auch forma. and the union kept a record of tho~e 
~ .... .L --
' who fell behind in their payments. A number of individual■ testified 
that they conaidered their contributions voluntary. Between Jan. 1 
and Oct. 14. 1963, union member■ contributed $1. 00 per day to the - - -
Fund and also $. 50 per day to general union fund■• Between Oct. 14. 
1963 and 1966, union member• paid $1. 00 per day to the Fund and 
alao $1. 00 per day aa the ba■ic union a•••••ment. After 1966. the 
total $2. 00 per day contribution wa• reallocated, with $. 50 per day 
goin1 to the Fund and $1. 50 per day gcilg to the general union 
treaaury. 
Non-union members working within the juriadiction of 
Local 562 were required to contribute• ' $2. 00 per day to the Fund. 
This contribution was exacted in lieu of the $8. 00 per month travel 





a• the a••e•sment for non-member• working within the jurisdiction 
of a local. In two or three t.olated in•tance•• non-member• 
•ucce••fully refu•ed to pay the a••e••ment. On the other hand. 
•ince Local 562 wae extremely powerful within Mi••ouri, mo•t 
worker• were willing to pay what wa• expected in order to obtain 
jobe at the high wage• which Local 562 could demand. There wa• 
at.o evidence that at lea•t one non-member worker wa• laid off --- -----------
within one week after refu•ing to pay the $2. 00 per day fee. --The Fund had no con•titution o r by-law•. no minute• of 
meeting•. no member•hip roll and no recording secretary. No 
audit of it• book• wa• ever conducted. and the Fund made no 
accounting of it• expenditure•. The •ame per•on• controlled the 
Fund and the union. The Fund made one $10. 000 di•bur•ement to 
union member• a• a •trike benefit. The Fund contributed $191. 000 
to build a recreation center and retirement hmne for •teamfitters; 
the member•hip was t>ld that it had been paid for out of union fund•. 
Between June and September of 1966. contribution• to the Fund were - --- -- -~ •u•pended in favor of contribution•• at the same rate. to the Callana11 
Gift Fund. the purpo•e of which wa• to give money to petr Callanan 
"to do with a• he •aw fit. 11 
The trial jucf&e (Regan) in•tructed the jury that S 610 was 
violated if the Fund was a aubterfuge through which the union it•elf -






the voluntarine•• of the ccmtribu.tion• by the member• wa• a factor 
to be con•idered, but it indicated that 
the mere fact that the payment• into the fund may have been 
made voluntarily by •ome or even all of the contributor• 
thereto doe• not, of it•eli. mean that money •o paid into 
the fund wa• not union money. 
The jury found that petr• were all guilty a• char1ed, but --found that " a willfu1 violation of Section 610 of Title 18, United 
State• Code, was not contemplated. " The •econd part of the verdict 
in•ulated petr• from enhanced puniahment under S 610. Local 562 
wa• fined $5. 000, and petr• Lawler and Seaton, who were union 
officer•. were •entenced to one year'• !_m._2ri•onment and fined 
$1. 000. The fourth defendant, Callanan, died while the petn for -
cert wa• pending. 
DECISION BELOW 
Petra were convicted in the USDC ED Mo (Regan). On appeal 1 
a ~ of the CA 8 (Van Ooaterhout, Blaclanun; Heaney, di•aenting) 
affirmed. Acknowledging that the •tatute burdened the fir•t amend-
ment ri1ht of a•aociational freedom. the court ruled that the Govern-
ment had a compellina intereat in protecting person• compelled to 
join a union a• a condition of emp,yment from bein1 forced to con-
tribute funda to promote political view■ different from their own. 
The court alao ruled that the atatute waa not impermiaaibly vape. 
Although a jury may have to evaluate the totality of circuma tancea 





or a aeparate entity, the union itaelf ia given fair notice that it may 
not make political contributions. The court alao ruled that§ 610 
did not diacriminate againat member• of the working cl•••; corpora-
tion••• well a• union• areprohibited from making political contri-
bution•, and S 610 doea not prohibit working per•on• from joining 
together to make political contribution•, it •imply prohibit. union• 
tk. CAA,~e;t 
from making auch contribution•. The court alao rejected,P..t S 610 
abridge• the right to vote for Congreaamen and Senator•. Finally, 
the court ruled that the jury verdict to the effect that there wa• no 
willful violation of S 610 did not undermine the validity of ita general 
verdict, finding that petr• had willfully engaged in the proacribed act1 
Judie Heaney diaaented on the ground that the trial jud1e had 
erroneously inatructed the jury•• to the importance of the voluntari-
neaa of the contributiona. The trial jlu:lge had atated that voluntari-
neaa waa only one factor to be conaidered, and that it could find petri 
guilty even if it believed all of the contribu.tiona were voluntary. Juds 
Heaney felt thia waa erroneoua. The correctneaa of the jury in-
atructiona waa not raiaed by petra on aepeal. 
The CA 8 then re-heard the caae en bane and affirmed pc 
(Mlltthea, Van Ooaterhout, Mehaffy It Gibaon; Lay, Heaney It Bri1ht, 
cliaaentin1). 'l;'~e majority relied on the ~inion of ~ud1e Van Ooater-
h.;~ fo-r "th"- or,yn~l f£V1e..l. J;.Jje Mo...---trh<s J Jol't1~ b( J"-"JU' 
• t: Mehaffy and Gibaon, filed a concurrina opinion atatin1 that be-
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original brief on appeal.,. /\. The di■■enter■ argued that the jury in-
atructton wa■ improper; and that it wa■ encmnpa■■ed within the 
challen1• to the con■tttutionaltty of S 610, a■ applied to petr■• 
CONTENTIONS 
A. Sufficiency of the indictment and the evidence 
Petra' Argument■ 
Petr■ contend that S 610 only prohibit■ political contribution• 
and expenditure■ by labor union■; the evidence here ■howed that no 
money■ had been contributed from general union fund■• ~he legi■la­
tive hi■tory of S 610 clearly indicate■ that the ■ectton waa not in-
tended to pro■cribe contribution■ by union people to a ■pecial or-
ganisation the funds of which are earmarked for political purpose■• 
It bas long been a■■umed that a union can form a parallel political 
or1anisation for the purpose of obtaining fund■ by direct voluntary 
contribution■ from members. Althouah there may have been evidence 
that ■oaie contribations re involuntary, the weipt of the evidence 
■how■ that the contribution■ were voluntary, and the money cl• rly 
did not become that of the union. -
Argmnenta of AFL-CIO •• amicu■ 
The AFL-CIO contends that the contributions were not made 
from the union trea■ury, and that § 610 doe■ not prohibit contri-
butions from labor political com.mittees. 
-
-




Argument• of variou• labor leader• a• amtci 
Amici contend that the indictment did not charge an offen•e 
under S 610 becau•e the provi•ion only reach•• direct po~itical 
contribution• by labor union•. Uthe union here made any con-
tribution it was indirect, bein1 routed through the Fund • 
Argument• of SG 
The SG contend• that the theory of the pro•ecution wa• that 
the Fund wa• a union fund and that the Fund itself wa• indi•tinaui•h-
able from the union. It i• not denied that a union could e•tabli•h a 
political organization for the purpoae of receiving fund• earmarked -
for political contribution•, bat the Government •ought to prove and 
the jury wa• aaked to ftnd that the Fund wa• not an entity apart 
from Local 562. 
Argument• of National Ript to Work Legal Defen•e Foundation, 
a• amtcu• 
The amicu• contend• that the evidence •howa that the con-
tribution• were clearly mandatory; it ia a pure charade t o •ay that 
union member• would contribute $20 to $50 of their monthly eaming• 
to aupport political candidate• if they had any real choice in the 
inatler. 
---. 
B. Jury inatruction• 
Petra' Argmnent• 
Petra contend that the i••ue of voluntarineas wa• pivotal, and 





find petra guilty even if all the contribution• were voluntary. If con-
tribution• to the Fund were voluntary, that ia, if they did not 
repreaent union duea, then it would be clear that the Fund would 
be a aeparate entity not prohibited under S 610 from making political 
contribution•. Although the validity of the inatruction wa• not 
explicitly raiaed on appeal, it wa• encon1paaaed within the contention 
that the atatute wa• unconatitutional •• applied to them. 
The AFL-CIO and variou• labor leader• a• amici do not 
apeciftcally argue to thia point. 
SG I. Arsumenta 
The SG contend.a that the term "voluntary" wa• uaed at trial 
to mean "willin1, " and that in thia context, it wa• proper for the trial 
judge to inatruct the jury that it could find petr• guilty even if all of 
the contribution• were made willingly. Moreover, the fact that con-
tributiona are voluntarily made to a labor union doe• not permit the - --------
union to make political contribution•. It i• one thing to ••Y that a ..--- ---
union can eatablbh a voluntary political organization, and it i• quite 
another to ••Y that the union can employ it■ inherently coercive due• 
collecting machinery to collect technically voluntary contributions 
earmarked for political purpo•••• 
The National Right to Work Legal Defen•e Foundation a• 




C. Conatitutionality of S 610 
Petra' Argument• 
- 11 -
Petra contend, firat, that§ 610, aa conatrued and applied by 
the court• below, abridge• their firat amendment righta. They 
argue that the courta below conatrued the atatute to prohibit political 
contribution• by parallel political organizationa. The firat amend-
ment protect• the freedom to aaaociate to achieye political aima. 
Thua S 610 would even be unconatitutional if it prohibited a union 
, itaelf from collecting voluntary contribution• and placing them in 
a special bank account earmarked for political expenditure. Petra 
also contend that I 610 ta unconatttutionally vaaue because it fails to 
provide a reasonably aacertainable atandard of suilt. U any oae 
of numeroua factors i• relevant to the issue whether a political 
fund is in fact a union fund, it ia virtually impoaaible for a union to 
eatabliah a parallel political organisation with assurance that it does 
not violate the law. Petra contend, third, that S 610 discriminates 
againat working people. The section operates as a total ban on con-
tributions by organiMff labor, but management can make political ex-
penditures throuah unincorporated associations auch as the National 
Aaaociation of Manufactur ers. Lastly, petra argue that§ 610 
violates their Art. I, § 2 and aeventeenth amendment right to vote 
for Senatore and B.epreaentativea in Coqreaa. 
The AFL-CIO aa amtcua doea not specifically contend that 






Argument• of varioua labor leader• a• amici 
Amici contend that the "expenditure" proviaion of § 610 i• 
inaeparable from the "contribution" proviaion. and that the former i• 
unconatitutional becauae it prohibit• organized labor from •pending &.1 
money where the primary purpoae ia to apeak to the public at large 
about it• view• on political iaauea. 
SG'• Arguments 
The SG contend• that § 610 •erve• to advance ~o le1itimate 
and compelling legialative objective•: ------
(1) to prevent the manipulation of the elective proceas 
by the great a11regationa of wealth aaaembled by both 
corporation• and union•, a.ncl 
(2) to forecloae the u•e of general corporate or union 
fund• to aupport idea• a.ncl candidate• oppoaed by a 
minority of the ahareboldera or union member•. 
Petra ftrat amendment argument ia baaed on the asaumption that 
f 610 prohibit• parallel political organizations; but § 610 doe• not bar 
the formation of voluntary political organizations. If anything, § 610 
preserves first amendment right• by preventing union majorities fro1 
- - - - ----------
dictatiq to union minorities. Nor i• the statute impermiaaibly vague 
. - -- -
the fact that a caae may turn on a conteated factual iasue does not 
make the statute under which the prosecution ia brouaht impermiaaibl 
vape. This ia a aimple caae involvina a charge of direct contributia 
by a labor oraanlzation to candidate• for federal office. Petra' cbarg, 
of discriminatory effect ia unfounded; the member• of a union can 
•till aaaociate for political purpo•e•• but minority member• may 





The National Ri1ht to Work Legal Defen•e Foundation a• 
amicu• echoe• the argument• of the SG in •upport of the con-
•titutionality of S 61 O. 
D. lncon•i•tent jury verdict• 
Petr•' Argument• 
Petre contend that •ince the jury made a •pecial finding 
that "a willful violation of Section 610 wa• not contemplated," 
the e•••ntial element of willfwne•• of a con•piracy wa• lacking. 
Unle•• conduct la malum in ee, the •cienter element of a con-
•piracy mu•t extend to knowledge that the agreed upon conduct 
ia unlawful. 
SG'• Argusnent• 
The SO contend• that it wa• aufficient that the jury found 
that petr• had voluntarily and purpoeely done that which the law 
forbid•. Even a••umina that there wa• •ome incon•iatency in 
the jury verdict•, such incon•i•tency doe• not require rever•al of 
a conviction. 
DISCU5mON 
The Court ha• never paa•ed on the con•titutionallty of any 
part of S 610 or of any related •tatute. However, the Court ha• ---------=--
dealt with I 610 and it• predece•aor in two ca•••• In United State• 
v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, (1948), the Court held that the predece••o~ of 
I 610 (S 313 of the Corrupt Practice• Act of 1925, a• amended by 





publiah a periodical expresaing a political meaaage. The Court 
was cle arly iJlterpretina the statute to avoid what it viewed as 
"1rave" conatitutional problem•. In Unitecl Statea v. Auto Workers. 
352 U.S. 567 (1957). the Court rulecl that S 610 does prohibit the 
use of union duea to aponeor commercial teleriaion broadcaata 
advocating the election of a certain candidate. SiJlce that ca•• came 
up on the diamiaaal of an indictment., the Court declinecl to rule on t1 
constitutionality of S 610 a• applied to such a union expenditure. In 
International Aaaociation of Machiniata v. Street. 367 U.S. 740 
(1961). a case not inYolviJlg S 610. the Court ruled that S Z Eleventh, 
of the .Railway Labor Act, which authorise• union-ahop agreements, 
deniecl a union the power to apeDd the dues of an objectina member 
for political caua••• These caaea provide, at moat a backdrop for 
this caae. rather than any definitive pidance. 
I think the jw:lpnenta of conviction should be affirmed. I thin] 
the Government can -- consistent with the firat amendment -- pro-
hibit unions from apending union fwula for the aupport of political 
. 
candidatea. The burden on the freedom of associations to engage ill 
political activity is. I believe. mo~• than offset by the need to protec 
minority union members from havill& their money uaed to aupport . . 
candidates whom they oppose. Althoqh there is aome evidence that 
the contributions in thia caae were technically voluntary, it i• quite 





with the collection of normal union •••••nnenta. The record 
atronaly reveal• that union member• and particularly nonmember• 
worJdn1 wt.thin the jurisdiction of the union were compelled in a 
practical sense to contribute to the Fund a• a condition of their 
employment. To permit unions to collect political contributions 
within the framework of their normal collection of dues, with the 
caveat that the contributions be voluntary in some technical sense, 
would undoubtedly emasculate the salutary purpoae of S 61 O. 
However, everyone acknowledge a that a union may eatabliah 
a parallel political association (■uch a• COPE) to make political 
contributions. The SG atate■ that thia caae ha• nothin1 to do with 
the validity of auch parallel political entitle■ becauae the indictment 
allege• and the caae went to the jury on the theory that it v.·a• the 
union itaeU which made the contribution•. But the SG doe• little to 
explain how e2actly a parallel aaaociation would differ from a fund 
within a union such •• this. One poa■ible distinction would be the 
voluntarine•• of the contribution■• The SG baa implcitly rejected 
thi• distinction by defending the juqe'• instruction to the jury to the 
!/ 
effect that YOluntarineaa, of itself, i• not determinative. TheSG 
!/ 
The SG baa mentioned but not relied on the fact that petra di 
not originally challenge thi■ jury inatruction on appeal to the CA 8. 
Although a majority of the CA 8 did rely on the failure to challenge 
the jury inatruction on appeal, I think it i• part of the caae becauae 





attempts to explain this away by urgin1 that "voluntarineaa" was usecl 
at trial and in the jury instruction to mean "willingne••• 11 rather thall 
genuine voluntariness. I think this is too tenuous a distinction on 
Hoc.ue.V~ r, 
which to rely. •' ■ • ■ nnnar. if voluntarin••• were the sole factor used 
to diatinguiah a parallel political aaaociation from a fund within a 
union. S 610 would do little to inaulate minority union member• from 
the inherently coercive effect• of collection by the union. The Court 
would do better to iaolate several characteriatics of a truly separate 
~ - - ------ - -
political entity and make clear that auch an entity waa not involved in -
thia case. I think thia will be a significant challenge for whomever -
ia writing the opinion. but that it can be accomplished. The one 
trouble with thia approach is that it give• aame credence to petra' 
allegation of vagueneas. However, petra were on notice that a unio1 
per se ia not permitted to make political contributiona. and on all of 
the facta of this caae it ia difficult to sympathise with their position. 
In the future. union• will hopefully have the guidance of the Court'• 
opinion in atructuring political aaaociationa ao as to be truly aeparat• 
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No . 70-74 • • • ~-- -, ~~,, 
f,J,'fJ" cemtnf-
I am in substantial / with the CJ ' s Bench Memo recommending 
that the Union ' s conviction be affirmed . The only question 
really critical in this case is whether , as applied here , the 
Corrupt Practices Act (Section 610) is unconstitutional . Petrs 
have argued that if the contributions were found to be voluntary 
that finding should end the case , i . e ., that the statute is 
unconstitutional if it is r ead to prohibit voluntary contri -
butions . They say that the Court has two choices: (1) inter-
pret the statute narrowly to preserve its constitutionality--a 
result which would require reversal and remand for new trial at 
which the jury would be instructed that voluntariness is a complete 
defense; or (2) rule that the statute is unconstitutional be-
cause it violates the employees ' right of association . 
to this Hobson ' s Choice is that Congress The short answer -seems to have made a legislative determination that , given the -labor union context , contributions to the union itself are never 
• 
• 
truly voluntary . Congress has made the judgment that where the 
contributions are made to a bona fide separate political organ-
zation it will presume the contributions to have been made 
voluntaril ~ but that when the political arm is not distinct , 
~ 
~~· 
~  when contributions are collected through the regular dues -
paying machinery , when nonmembers are assessed political contri - ~~ 
~ 
butions in lieu of the customary travel card fee , when funds are , ~ --used for union projects (strike fund & retirement home) , when I~~ 
uniformity of contributions is the universal rule-- both as to 
- ------- - -
size of contribution and frequency --, th~ ontributions cannot be} 
viewed as entirely voluntary and are , therefore , pro bibitable . 
This is essentially the manner in which the jury was in-
structed (see pp 16- 20 of SG ' s brief) . Voluntariness is a factor 
to be considered in determini~g whether the political organi -
zation is independent , but it is not determinative . The statute 
does not prohibit union members and sympathizers from mak~ng 
voluntary political contributions , it merely prohibits making 
such contributions ta the union itself . Construed in this light 
I do not find the statute subject ta serious constitutional 
attack . In this regard , it might prove illuminating ta inquire 
of the Government lawyer at oral argument (if he does not address 
himself directly ta the question) what factors he would catalog 
.........,._ .....,. -
as indicators that a political fund was independent from the union . 
There is nothing to the argument expressed by several judges 
in the CA that Petr may not challenge the jury instructions and 
may not ask for a new trial because that issue was not presented an 
appea!. By claiming that the statute was unconstitutional as applied 
~ 
~ 
• it prese·nted the court with the opportunity to impose a narrowing 
construction . Such,a narrowing construction would require remand 
and retrial under correct instructions . 
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- CHAMBER S O F JUSTICE WM . J . BRENNAN. JR. February 14, 1972 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
RE: No. 70-74 - Pipefitters Union v. United States 
With Harry not participating and Bill Douglas and Potter dis-
senting, the Conference voted 6 to 2 to affirm the Eighth Circuit 
which 4 to 3 sustained the conviction of Pipefitters for violating 18 
U o S. Co § 610 by making "a contribution or expenditure in connection 
with" federal elections. The moneys were in fact spent by- an entity· 
styled the "Pipefitters Voluntary, Political, Educational, Legislativ.e, . 
Charity and Defense Fund." The proofs were that Pipefitters. formally · 
set up the fund separate from the union and the union treasury,. that 
union officials solicited member and non-member (but union) work-
men to contribute to the fund, and that union officials as fund officials: 
expended the fund to support candidates of their choice without reference 
to the contributors preferences or choices. In those circumstanceHthe 
Government contended, as stated in its brief, that the fund "was: ih.fa-ct 
a union fund, controlled by the union, contributions to which were. 
-
- 2 -
assessed by the union as part of its dues structure", and thus- that 
the moneys spent constituted "a contribution or expenditure" by the 
union in violation of § 610. 
Last week the President signed the "Federal Election Cam-
paign Act of 1971." By its terms it becomes effective April 7 next. 
That Act adds a paragraph to § 610 with the purpose, according to 
its sponsor in the House, Hansen of Idaho, "to spell out in more de-
tail what a labor union • • • can or cannot do in connection with a 
Federal election. " One of the things the paragraph provides that a 
labor union can do without violating § 610 is "the establishment, 
administration and solicitation of contributions_ tff a separate segre- · 
gated fund to be utilized for political purposes., " except that the .fund 
will violate § 610 "by utilizing money or anything· of value· secured by 
physical force, job discrimination, financial r.eprisals, . or. the :threat 
of force, job discrimination or financial reprisal; or. by dues, fees : 
or other monies required a~ a condition ot membership in a:labor 
organization or as a condition of employment, or by monies-obtained 
in any commercial transaction. " 
-
- 3 -
On its face, the added paragraph may be read to sanction 
what the Government at trial and in this Court contended § 610 
did not permit, namely the establishment and administration by 
the union of a separate fund applied to support candidates of the 
union's choice and made up of monies solicited by union officials 
from the union members. A violation, in other words, is proved 
in such cases only if it may be found that the contributors were 
coerced or harassed in one of the mentioned ways to make contri-
butions, or if the fund includes dues, fees or other monies required 
as a condition of union membership. Since neither the indictment, 
the proofs, nor the jury instructions reflect the teaching of the new 
paragraph - indeed seem to make unlawful what_ the new paragraph 
seems to make lawful - the question arises whether. the-new para-
graph applies to the decision of this_ case, and if so, with what re- -
sult. 
There is a principle of federal law,. fir.st. expressed by Chief 
Justice Marshall in 1801 in United States v. Schooner Peggy, 1 
Cranch 103, to the effect that convictions on direct. r.eview at the 
time the conduct in question is no longer· unlawful_ by · statute, must 
abate. A recent application of the principle was in.Hamm v • . R-oc~ 
,_ - 4 -
Hill, 379 U.S. 306 (1964). Does that principle apply in thi~ _case? 
I doubt that the fact the new paragraph does not become law until 
April 7 leads to a negative answer. But in the House debates, there 
was considerable heat about whether the parag::i;aph was written by 
AFL-CIO for the express purpose of overruling the Eighth Circuit's 
construction of § 610 in Pipefitters. Representative Hansen vehemently 
denied that this was the purpose (I don't find any denial of alleged AFL-
CIO authorship) and insisted that the paragraph simply codified existing 
law and expressed what Congress always meant original § 610 to pro-
vide. The opponents quoted an unidentified Justice Department spokes-
man as saying, "The Hansen provision not only doesn't codify existing 
law, but it overrules existing law." I lean. at this writing. to the view 
that whether the paragraph codified existing law or· made: new law, if. 
applicable to the Pipefitter prosecution it nullifies the Government's 
theory of the union's guilt. In that circumstanc.e, would the. Govern-
ment be permitted to try the Pipefitters again, or wuuld-the:prosecution 
be abated? 
There is a federal savings statute which is designed to nullify 
abatement of federal convictions. It is 1 U • .S •. C •. § 109. which provides· 
that ''The repeal of any statute shall not have the. effe.c.t tu release or 
-
- 5 -
extinguish any penalty incurred under such statute, unless the re-
pealing Act shall so expressly provide, and such statute shall be 
treated as still remaining in force for the purpose of sustaining 
any proper • • . prosecution for the enforcement of such penalty 
.••• " In Hamm v. Rock Hill, supra, however, the Court gave 
this statute the narrow construction that it was meant to obviate 
only "mere technical abatement", which I take it means only 
prosecutions under statutes which have been expressly repealed. 
Whatever significance is attached to the new paragraph, it does 
not purport to be an expres s repealer of anything in § 610. 
I plan to circulate a more detailed memorandum· when my 
views become more settled. I expect we- must at. the least afford 
the parties an opportunity to address themselves· to the qµestion 
whether the paragraph applies to this case and, if so, with .what 
result. Whether that should take the form of su1mlementaL briefs 
or reargument is of course for the Conference- to decide. 
W-~X. B. Jr:. 
-
~ n.pn-me <!;om:t of tl1 e'J.'.-1niteb .:§tnicg 
'Jllnsir:ngt01t, p. <!J. 20,[;Ji,.;J 
C H AMBERS OF 
JU S T IC E WI L LI A M 0 . DOUG L AS February 14, 1972 
Dear Bill: 
In No. 70-74 - Pipefitters Un i on 
v. United States, the new Act to becou e 
effective April 7, 1972 does add a new 
dimension to our problem and I would think 
that the thing to do at the pres e nt time 
would be to ask the parties for supplemental 
briefs. Maybe the r e will be a consensus 
develop out of that exchang e that will 
obviate putting the case down for reargument, 
which I would hate to see happen. 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
CC: The Conference 
/ 





CHAMBER S O F 
THE CHIEF JUST! C!:: 
~u:p-r.mre QJqm.--t af tire ~ 1titi-~ ~tattn 
:Wagfrhtfit!l1t. 11). <!J. 20.;iJ!.~ 
February 15, 1972 
No. 70-74 -- Pipefitt e rs Loc al No, 562 v. U.S. 
Dear Bill: 
I have your February 14 memo and Bill 
Douglas' memo of the same date. 
For my part, I would dis pose of the 
case on the basis of the Conference decision. The 
provisions of 1 U.S. C. § 109 afford an answer. 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Conference 
( 
-
@ffice of tbe ~olicitor ~eneral 
mlla~bington, 1S.<tl:. 20530 
February 14, 1972 
Honorable E. Robert Seaver 
Clerk 
Supreme Court of the United States 
Washington, D. c. 20543 
:;s\:'19~~-·7 
orr- CE. OF I i-; . • )K 
s~_i;..): ~t.:£ co\Jrt(, t, s. --- .... ..;...., ___ _ 
Re: Pipefitters Local Union No. 562, et al. v. 
United States (No. 70-74, Oct. Term, 1970) 
Dear Mr. Seaver: ·--
The purpose of this letter is to advise the Court 
that an amendment to 18 u.s.c. 610 has been enacted since 
the argument of the above case. Public Law 92-225, approved 
on February 7, 1972, will become effective on April 7, 1972 , 
and amends Section 610 by adding the following paragraph: 
As used in this section, the phrase 'contribution 
or expenditure' shall include any direct or indirect 
payment, distribution, loan, advance, deposit, or gift 
of money, or any services, or anything of value 
(except a loan of money by a national or State bank 
made in accordance with the applicable banking laws 
and regulations and in the ordinary course of business) 
to any candidate, campaign committee, or political 
party or organization, in connection with any 
election to any of the offices referred to in this 
section: but shall not include communications by a 
corporation to its stockholders and their families 
or by labor organization to its members and their 
families on any subject: nonpartisan registration 
and get-out-the-vote campaigns by a corporation -aimed 
at its stocholders and their families, or by a labor 
organization aimed at its members and their families: 
the establishment, administration, and solicitati o n 




·. ilized for political purposes by a corporation 
or labor organization: Pr·ovided, That ·.. ,hall be 
unlawful for such a fund to make a contribution 
or expenditure by utilizing money or anything of 
value secured by physical force, job discrimination, 
f inancial reprisals, or the threat of force , job 
discrimination, or financial reprisal: or by dues~ 
fees , or other monies required as a condition of 
membership in a labor organization or as a condition 
of employment, or by monies obtained in any 
commercial transaction. 
\ 
Of course, under established principles, the present cas e 
is governed by Section 610 as it existed during the acts of'"- - 1 
the defendants, and their trial and conviction. 1 u.s.c. 109. 
cc: 
~ery truly yours, 
~~ r; , I 
(_ ~ I 'f--/ "J ~ ~ -2---~ /z r.--9~~\JCd 
Murray Randall, Esquire -
506 Olive Street 
St. Louis, Missouri 63101 
John Lo Boeger, Esquire 
408 Olive Street 
St •• Louis, Missouri 63102 
Richard L. Daly, Esquire 
7 North Seventh Street 
St. Louis, Missouri 63101 
Erwin N. Griswold 
Solicitor General 
I 
Morris A. Shenker, Esquire 
408 Olive Street 
St. Louis, Missouri 63102 
I 
Normans. London, Esquire· 
418 Olive Street 
St. Louis, Missouri 63102 




/-.,~ - 9 ~~, I~ 
Re, Pi2efitters Union v, United States ~ ~4~/-(,..J__. '~. 
Judge: - 7 '~~ 
This case was argued during your first week on the Court. 
You votet-fwith the majority to affirm the conviction against the 
Union for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 610. That is the law which 
prohibits labor unionSfrom making contributions to political 
campaigns. Justice Brennan was assigned the opinion for the 
Court. He has circulated the attached memorandum indicating that 
Congress has added a new paragraph to section 610, as part of the 
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971. This addition to the 
statute raises the quest_ion _wht;l].er it~ ects . th_e_£resent conviction. - -~ -
Justice Brennan appears to be of the tentative that it does not. 
He will, however, circulate another memo after he has thought more 
on the matter. 
Justice Brennan suggests that the parties be given an oppor-
tunity to respond on this question. Justice Douglas agrees but 
the Chief Justice sees no need to seek further assistance and is 
prepared to dmcide the case on what we have now. 
The SG has filed a two-page note, informing the Court that 
I the law had been amended, and stating that it can have no impact on this case. I am confident that the defendant Union will 
respond to that letter, so that it will not be necessary to re-
quest a response. 
My tentative conclusion is that this amendment can have no 
...... .......... 
impact on the decision of this case. The AFL-CIO - - -~"""---·-
instrumental in getting the amendment; and it may 
the future; but under the old law"-and it has not 
this conviction must stand. 
::::a:e~:: II 
been repealed--
I would, therefore, suggest a short memo to Justice Brennan 






I assume that the Solicitor General's letter dated February 
14, 1972 will engender a response from Petitioners without 
this Court requesting one.<f[While I will await further con-
sideration of this problem pending your final views, my 
tentative inclination is that the amendment to section 610 
should not affect the Court's decision. 
LAH 
- CHAMBERS OF JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 
$5uµum.e QJcurt of fltt ~1tilt~ ~htf.tg 
)'JasJringfon. tE). C!l, 2llffeJ!.~ 
February 16, 1972 
Re: No. 70-74 Pipefitters Union v. 
United States 
Dear Bill: 
I assume that the Solicitor General's letter dated February 
14, 1972, will engender a response from Petitioners without this 
Court requesting one. 
While I will await further consideration of this problem pending 
your final views, my tentative inclination is tmt the amendment to 
section 610 should not affect the Court's decision. 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
CC: The Conference 
Sincerely, 
t ~--__;_,a_.) 
- CHAMBERS OF JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL,J R . 
Dear Bill: 
~ttJtUtttt <qourt of f~t 2£lttitth ~fctftg 
'J!Ula$-£riltflfott, ~. <q. 211JiJJ.,'.3 
February 24, 1972 
I concur in the questions proposed in No. 70-74 Pipefitters 
v. u. s. 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
· cc: The Conference 
Sincerely, 
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.:%u.prcmt ~ourt o-f Ure ~ttiteb ;%trues 
~asfringtan, ~. <!J. -2.llffe'!.3 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WM. J . BRENNAN, JR. March 29, 1972 
RE: No. 70-74 - Pipefitters Local Union #562 
v. United States 
Dear Bill: 
Thank you very much for your note of 
March 29. I am delighted to accept your 
suggestion in the concluding paragraph and 
am revising the footnote in that way. 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 




~u;trtmt ~ourl of Hrt 'Jluri.ttb ~ta±tg 
._-as!rhigL?l4 }0. ~- 20ffe'1.;l 
- JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
March 29, 1972 
Re: 70-74 - Pipefitters Local Union #562 v. United States 
Dear Bill: 
As I mentioned to you the other day, unless one of the 
brethren comes up with a rather earth shaking refutation of 
your account of the legislative history in this case, I 
would like to join your opinion. I have one problem with your 
footnote no. 53 - on page 56 of the second draft. As I under-
stand the record, the issue upon which your opinion decides 
the case was fully presented to the trial court, appropriate 
instructions were requested, and the trial court denied them. 
Thus we are not dealing with the situation presented in 
Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, where the Court at page 
107 said that "fundamental" error could be noted even though 
there was no exception to the trial court's charge; to me it 
takes a very strong case of "plain error" to overcome the 
failure to raise the issue at trial, where if it had been 
presented the trial court might have adopted the proposed 
instruction, or rejected the objectionable one, and thereby 
cured the error. What we have here, as I understand it, is 
an error fully preserved in the trial court, but claimed to 
have been abandoned in the Court of Appeals. It seems to me 
this should be an easier kind of error for this Court to 
reach, both because of our own Rule 40(1) (d) (2), and because 
of Silber v. United States, 370 U.S. 717, which you cite in 
the footnote. I think it should be a good deal easier for 
a party who is basically making a second appellate argument 
I 
/ 
- - 2 -
before this Court to persuade it to notice a point that was 
fully made in the trial court, but perhaps not made in 
argument to the federal Court of Appeals, than it should be 
for that party to persuade either appellate court to notice 
a deficiency in the instructions which was never urged as 
error in the trial court, and which that court therefore 
never had an opportunity to consider before the case went to 
the jury. 
Would you be receptive to the idea of adding, in the 
footnote language, after the words in the seventh line 
"instructions were plainly erroneous", the phrase "and the 
claim of error was brought to the attention of the trial 
court", and then cite only Silber, and not Screws? 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Conference 
Sincerely, 






Res Pipefitters Local Union No. 562 v. United States, No. 70-74 
Judges 
Pursuant to your instruction, I have taken a look at 
the legislative history of the Corrupt Practices Act, 18 
u.s.c. § 610. The hearings, reports and debates are quite 
extensive and my search has not been as pervasive as I would 
ordinarily prefer. Hmrever, the task has been made somewhat 
more manageable in that we have a number of cross-checks to 
assure that my reading of the history does not diverge 
substantially from the correct views my reading dovetails 
substantially with Justice Brennan's, the petitioners~ and -the view taken in the few law review articles in the area. 
My conclusions are as follows, 
(1) Section 610--prior to the recent amendment--must be 
read in the manner suggested in Justice Brennan's opinion. 
It is clear, almost beyond question, that the statute was 
not designed to eliminate the union members from banling 
J 
together under the leadership of the union leaders to pro-
-- - .............. 
vide financial support for candidates. The only restrictions 
on the members are (1) any contribution or expenditure fund 
must be segregated from the general union dues; (2) union 
members must know what they are being asked to make contri-
butions to; and (3) they must··· be free to participate or not to 
participate without fear of reprisal. It makes no difference 
\ if the fund is in fact the "alter ego" of the unions it may be 
staffed by union leaders; union leaders may direct the use of 
the funds. This being the c ase, the Government must lose 
the instant case. The jury instructions allowed the juri to 





were voluntary and were made to a separate fund. The DC 
....,_ ..--
allowed the jury to focus attention on the degree of inde-
pendence of the fund. The instructions clearly said that 
the jury should weigh the voluntariness as a factor but that 
voluntariness itself would not be controlling. 
We have resisted this interpretation of the statute 
primarily because it seems to provide an easy means of 
avoiding the statutory prohibition. There is, I think, an 
answer why the statute allows this opportunity to union 
members. The '47 Act was a measure promoted by Republicans. 
Truman's veto was anticipated well in advance and it was clear 
to the leaders of the fight for approval of the legislation, 
especially Senator Taft, that he was going to have to have 
the votes of many democrats to pass the legislation. And, 
I 
the only way he could assure a 2/3 majority was to assure 
his democratic colleagues that union members would still be 
free to maintain political action funds. If the Republicans 
had the strength to strong-arm the legislation through Con-
gress over the Presidential veto I think we might well have 
had much stiffer legislation. It was pretty clear during the 
hearings and debates that many Republicans had no love for 
Sidney Hillman and the CIC-Political Action Committee which 
had been such a significant force in the '44 re-election 
of FDR. In addition to the pragmatics of drafting acceptable 
legislation, there was the lurking problem of constitutionality. 
A law limiting the activities of individual union members 
would have run into serious difficulties. 
(2) In researching this issue, you have asked me to 





A number of points should be made as to corporations under the 
statute. First, it is clear that the statute applies equally 
to unJo,.!l.5 ~d corporations. The legislative history is replete 
with references to the desirability of equal treatment 
for corporations and unions. Therefore, this opinion will 
allow corporations to set up separate political funds to which 
stockholders could contribute--as long as the fund was 
maintained separately, the stockholders knew clearly what they 
were contributing to, and the contributions were voluntary. 
Second, a little history may be in order. The first 
Corrupt Practices Act was passed in 1907, It applied only 
to corporations--not to unions. The law prohibited "money 
contributions" to candidates in general elections. The 
primary motivation for that law was the fear that aggregations 
of great wealth were having an untoward influence on elective 
politics. There was a subsidiary interest in protecting 
stockholders from having their money used for purposes with 
which they disagreed, but the undue influence consideration 
seemed the more urgent at the time. In 1925, the Act was 
amended to change "money contribution" to "contribution" 
thereby cl0sing one loophole which had grown up--instead of 
making direct financial contribution$, the great corporations 
were making indirect contributions in the form of free advertis-
ing, services, etc. The 1925 Act did not apply to unions. 
\
The first application of the prohibition to unions came in 
1943. Thrown into the Smith-Connally Act almost without 
comment was an amendment to the Corrupt Practices Act stating 
that until the end of the War unions could not make political 





that prohibition in effect. Finally in 1947 the prohibition 
became permanent and several loopholes that had sprung up 
during the '44 and '46 elections were closed. 
Surprisingly enough, section 610 has been only very 
rarely enforced at all. Indeed, in 1961, the author of a 
law review article asserted that there had never been a 
prosecution against a corporation under section 610. Since 
that time there has only been one case in which the section 
was used to prosecute a corporation, that was the Lewis Foods 
case decided by the CA9 in 1966 (there conceivably might be 
other prosecutions but that is the only one that has yielded 
a printed opinion). 
My reaction is that there are significant differences 
between unions and corporations in their structure that make 
it more unlikely that corporations will be able successfully 
to establish parallel political committees. Stockholders are 
not under the same institutional pressures as are union 
members. A union member's livelihood depends in large measure 
on the success of the union's activities, much more so I 
would suspect that a mere stockholder in a corporation. 
The closer factual situation would occur in a case in which 
a corporation establishes a political fund for employees to 
contribute to. Under section 610 aq'corporation could 
set up such a fund, as long as its identity and separateness 
are clear and employees are not coerced. 
(3) Although I now recommend that, as to the central 
issue in the case, you concur in Justice Brennan's opinion, 
I remain troubled about his treatment of sec*ion 205 of the 





that the amendment makes no significant changes in the core of ........ ,.),,,. 
cwt ... 
the statute. It provides confirmation that union political .. 
action funds are permissible under the guidelines laid down 
in the opinion. 
Having reached the conclusion that the case must be returned 
to the DC, Justice Brennan then goes one step beyond. He 
notes that, in one respect, section 205 does work a substantive 
change. It clearly permits a union to use funds collected from 
general dues to establish and maintain a political action 
fund. He concludes that prior to the amednent, a union -was barred from using its general funds to establish and lll§.in-
tain the political fund. He then procedes to tell the Gov-
ernment that on remand they might ~hange the theory of their , 
case and prosecute for failing to maintain the req~site 
separation. There are several problems with this approachs 
(a) I am not satisfied that it is uncontrovertibly clear 
that a union may not have some overlapping in expenditures 
for administering the fund prior to the amendment. The 
central example cited by all the debaters in the history is 
the case of PAC. It is pointed out that PAC did a pretty good 
job of maintaining separation of the funds at the national 
level Mi#ijji#ijlj#did#d6i and at the grass roots level but 
that in the regional and state offices there was considerable 
duplication (the same people performed functions for PAC and 
for the CIO; they used the same office space, the same 
typewriters and equipment). The legislative history does not 
make clear to me that Congress clearly contemplated that after 
the '47 Act a union could not use union funds to establish the 





In the instant case, the indictment alleged that 
political funds were collected by shop stewards at the 
plant. Under that indictment the Government might prove that 
the collections were being made on company time and that 
union officials were being remunerated for performing that 
service for the political fund. The Government might also 
demonstrate that the union was not sufficiently scrupulous 
in maintaining the separation of personnel and equipmenu 
between the management and administrative facilities of 
the fund and the union. If either can be proved, Justice 
Brennan says that a clear violation will have been established. 
Another view of the legislative history is that Congress 
recognized that despite its good faith effort, PAC was simply 
not able to sustain itself without inevitable crossing over 
between the union and the fund at some levels. It might be 
argued that Congress accepted that such de minimus use of 
union assets to manage the fund is not exceptionable. At 
any rate, I do not see the question as open and shut as 
the majority opinion appears to believe. 
(b) The proponent of section 205, Mr Hansen in the House 
of Representatives, did not perceive the sharp difference 
found by Justice Brennan. Throughout the debates it was 
his stance that the amendment to section 610 was nothing more 
than a codification and clarification of the statute. I 
do not think that he thought that he was legalizing something 
that was heretofore clearly illegal. 
(c) The Government is of the same view. When asked 
whether they found any differences of consequence in the amend -





that there were no material differences in the new amendment 
to section 610. Indeed, looking over the briefs in this 
case, it is clear that the Government has never focused on 
this matter of expenditure of union dues to support and 
maintain the political fund. That would be a much easier and 
stJraightforward way to prosecute the case but yet the Govern-
\.:.., 
ment has not seen the light. Of course, the Government 
might have brought this case as a test case for a broader 
theory, but I think that they really have not focused on this 
aspect of the statute • 
(d) It strikes me as inappropriate for this Court to 
hold that certain conduct constitutes a clear violation of 
the statute, without first giving the parties an opportunity 
to brief the question. This segment of the opinion will come 
as a complete surprise to the parties. Since, in my view, the 
question is not simply open-and-shut, I would be hesitant 
about stating fianlly what the statute proscribes. 
RECOMMENDATION 
I think you should concur in the major portion of the 
opinion. If you find troublesome the last segment of Justice 
Brennan's opinion, then we should consider writing a short 
separate concurring opinion stating that we think it wiser 
to avoid reaching an interpretation of the statute that is 
not properly before the Court since neither side has proffered 
this theory of the case. Also, if you should decide to write 
separately, you might add a comment about the paucity of the 
statutory prohibition--how easy it is for unions to elude pro-
secution under the present statute. 
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PIPEFITTERS v . UNITED STATES 
both; and if the violation was willful, shall be fined 
not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than 
two years, or both. 
"For the purposes of this section 'labor organiza-
tion' means any organization of any kind, or any 
agency or employee representation committee or 
plan, in which employees participate and which exist 
[sic] for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing 
with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, 
wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or con-
ditions of work." 1 
The indictment charged, in essence, that petitioners had 
conspired from 1963 to May 9, 1968, to establish and 
maintain a fund that (1) would receive regular and 
systematic payments from Local 562 members and mem-
bers of other locals working under the Union's jurisdic-
tion; (2) would have the appearance, but not the reality 
of being an entity separate from the Union; and (3) would 
conceal contributions and expenditures by the Union in 
connection with federal elections in violation of § 610.2 
1 Section 371 , in turn, proYided: 
"If t\yo or more persons conspire ... to commi t an>· offense 
aga inst the United States . . . and one or more of such persons 
do any act to effect the objf'ct of the conspira cy, each shall be 
fiued not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than fiyc 
>·ears ,. or both. 
"If, howeYer, the offense; t he commission of which is the object 
of the conspirary, is a misdemeanor onl>·, t he punishment for such 
conspiracy shall not exceed the maximum punishment proYidecl for 
such misdemeanor. " 
2 Omitting the OYert acts cha rged, the indictment, filed :\Ia>· 9, 
1968, stated in releva nt part: 
"The Grand Jury charges: 
" l. That at all times hereinafter mentioned clefrnc!:tnt Pipefitters 
Local Union No. 562, St. Louis, Missouri (hereinafter referred to 
as Local 562), affiliated with the United Associat ion of Journeymen 
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The evidence tended to show, in addition to disburse-
ments of about $150,000 by the fund to candidates in 
federal elections, an identity between the fund and the 
and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipe Fitting Industry of the 
United States and Canada, AFL-CIO (hereinaft er referred to as 
the United Association) , was a labor organization within the meaning 
of Section 610 of Title 18, United States Code,. tha t is to say , an 
organization in which employees participated and which existed, 
in part , for the purpose of dealing with employers concerning 
griernnces, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment , 
or conditions of work. 
"3 . That from on or about October 12, 1966, up to and including 
t he date of the filing of this indictment, defendant Lawrence L. 
Callanan \Yas an officer of defendant Loca l 562 . 
"4. That at all times hereinafter mentioned defendant John L. 
Lawler was an offi cer of defendant Local 562 . 
"5. That at all times hereinafter mentioned, defendant George 
Seaton was an officer of defendant Local 562. 
"7. That at all times hereinafter mentioned, the Pipefitters Volun-
ta ry, Politica l, Educational , Legislatirn, Charity and Defense Fund 
(hereinafter the Fund) , was a fund of defendant Local 562, estab-
lished . maintained,. and administered by officers, employees, mem-
bers, agents, foremen and job stewards of defendant Local 562, to 
effect a regular and systematic collection , receipt, and expenditure 
of moneys obtained from working members of defendant Local 562 
and from \Yorking members of other labor organizations employed 
under the jurisdi ction of defendant Local 562. 
"9. That from in or about 1963 and cont inuously thereafter up 
to and including t he date of the filing of this indictment, in the 
City of St. Louis, in the East ern District of Missouri and else-
" ·here, Local 562, Lawrence L. Callanan, John L. La"·ler and 
George Seaton , tlrn defendants herein , and John F. Burke and 
Edward J . Steska, named herein as co-conspirators but not as 
defendants, unlawfully, wilfully and knowingly did conspire and 
agree with each other and with divers other persons to the grand 
.iurors unknown, to violat e Section 610 of Title 18, United States 
Code in that they did unlawfully, wilfully, and knowingly conspire 
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Union and a collection of well over $1 million in con/ 
trlbutio1;;' to the fond by a method similar to that em 
J;t';"yed ln ti1e col~tion of dues or assesments. In par 
nnd agree to hnYe Locnl 562 make contributions and expenditures 
in connection with elections at which Presidential and Yice Presiden-
tial electors or United States Senators nnd Rcpresentati,·es to 
Congress were to be Yoted for, and to wilfuU~, consent to the 
making of such contributions and expenditure" by Local 562 . 
"10. It ,ms n part of said conspirac~· tlrn t the defendants and 
co-conspirators would establish and maintain a special fund entitled 
'Pipefitters Volunt:uy Political. Educational,. Legislafo·e, Charity 
and Defense Fund,' which fund would ham the appearance of 
being a \Yholly independent entity, separate and npart from Local 
562; and that the defendants and co-ronspir:1 tors would thereby 
conceal the fact that Local 562 would make contributionR :1nd expen-
ditures in connection "·ith elections at which Presidential :-ind Vice 
Presidential electors or United St:-ites Senators and TirpresentatiYes 
to Congress were to be Yoted for. 
"11. It was further :1 part of the conspiracy thnt defend:-int 
.John L. Lawler ,rnuld be Director of the Fund nnd that at a certain 
time he would be succeeded :-is Director of the Fund bY defendant 
Lawrence L. Callnn:-in; and that the Director of the Fund would 
appenr to haYe control and management of the Fund, including 
the receipt :-ind di,bursement of mane~' and the keeping of its 
books. 
"12. It was further a part of the conspiracy that defcnd:-ints 
.John L. Lawler and Lrnnence L. Callanan would not hn,·e the 
books of the Fund audited,. or a.fford members of defendant Local 562 
and other pipefitters contributing to the Fund any accounting for 
the money on hand. paid into or disbursed from the Fund. 
"13. It was further a part of the conspiracy that the defendants 
nnd co-conspir:-itors, by means of the creation and oper:-ition of 
the Fund, would continue in new form the practice of collecting 
for politic:11 purposes One Dollar ($1.00) per dar worked from 
members of defendant Local 562 :-ind T\\·o Dollnrs ($2.00) per clay 
worked from non-member pipefitters emplo:ved on jobs ,Yithin the 
jurisdiction of defendant Local 562. 
"1-t. It ,ms further a p:-irt of the con,pirar>· that the defendants 
and co-conspirators would wniYe and fail to enforce Section 180 
of the Constitution of the United Association in order to facilit:-ite 
the payment of monies into the Fund, by failing to rollert from 
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ticular, it was established that from 1949 through 1962 / 
the Union maintained a political fund to " ·hich Union 
members and others working under the Union's jurisdic-
tion ,rnre in fact required to make contributions and that 
non-member~ of Loca l 562, working under its jurisdic tion, a re-
quired tnl\·cl ca rd fee of not in excess of Eight Dollars ($8.00) per 
month , and in lieu t hereof, collecting pa_vments to t he Fund at 
the rate of Two Doll:ns ($2.00) per eight-hour "·orking day from 
such non-members. 
"15. It wa,, furtl1er a part of t he conspiracy that the defendants 
and co-conspirators would cause general foremen, arc~ foremen , job 
stewa rds, officers, agents, employees and other members of Local 562 
act ing in a supervisor~- capacity over members and pipefitt ers 
"·orking on jobs under the jurisdiction of Local 562, to become 
agents of the Fund in order to facilitate the collection of monies 
for the Fund on a regular basis on job site,; and at the headquarters 
of Local 562. 1242 Pierce Annue, St . Louis, Missouri. 
"lG. It was further a part of t he ronspirac)· that tJ1e defendants 
nnd co-conspirntors. in order to facilitntc an orderl)·. regular and 
,)·stemntic rollection of contributions to the Fund, ,rnuld cau,c 
the ng0nts of the Fund , referred to in parngrnph 15 of this Indict-
ment to distribute to the pipefitters working at all job sites con-
tribution agreement cnrds to be signed b)· i:,uch pipefitters, and 
to distribute to foremen and ,iob stewnrds at such job Rites printed 
coll ection sheets for the Fund upon which to record the number 
of hours " ·orked b)· such pipefitters :ind the amount of the con-
tributions pnid b)· each into the Fund ; and that such foremen 
or ,iob stewards \\·oulcl acl,·iRe newly emplowd pipefittcrs at such 
.ioh s ites of the existence of the Fund and of the rates of partiri-
pct1ion , that is, for members of Loca l 562, One Dollar (Sl.00) per 
eight hours worked ; :i ncl a ft er J anunr,· 1, 1965, Fift~· Cents ($ .50) 
per ciiz:ht hours ,rnrked, and for members of other pipefitt.er locals 
Two Dollars (S2.00) per eight hours worked. 
" 17. It "·:is furt lwr a pnrt of the conspirnc~• that defendant 
Loral 562 would make substantial contributions in connection with 
the 1964 General Election and the 1966 General Election and that 
def Pndnnts Lawrence L. Callauan and John L. Lawler would con-
,rnt to such contributions b)· issuing clwrks drawn upon the account 
of the Fund in the a pproximate total amount of One Hundred 
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that fund was then succeeded in 1963 by the present fund, 
·which was, in form, set up as a separate "voluntary" 
organization. Yet a principal Union officer assumed the 
role of director of the present fund with full and unlimited 
control over its disbursements. The Union's business 
manager, petitioner La,vler, became the first director of 
the fund and was later succeeded by petitioner Callanan, 
whom one Local 562 member described as "the Union" 
in explaining his influence within the Local. Moreover, 
no significant change ,rns made in the regular and_§Y§j&-
m~fic method of col ection of contributions at a pre-
scribe · rate based on hours worked, and Union agents 
continued to collect donations at jobsites on Union time. 
In addition, changes in the rate of contributions were 
tied to changes in the rate of members' assessments. In 
1966, for example, when' assessments were increased from 
2½ o to 3¾ % of ross wao-es, the contribution rate was { 
decreased rom $1 to 5 ¢ per day worked with the result 
that the change did not cause, in the words of the Union's 
executive board, "one,,,.extra penny cost to members of 
Local Union 562.""' At th~ une';-ttt'°coiitrimt t,ion 
rate for nonmembers, who were not required to pay the 
prescribed travel card fee for working under Local 562's 
jurisdiction, remained the same at $2 per day worked, 
approximately matching the total ~ment and con-
tribution of members. Finally, in addition to political 
contributions, the fund used its monies for nonpolitical 
purposes, such as aid to financially distressed members on 
strike, and for a period of a few months, upon the vote 
of its members, even suspended collections in favor of 
contributions to a separate gift fund for petitioner Calla-
nan.3 Not surprisingly, various witnesses testified that 
3 These facts petitioners, in essence, concede in their brief, Peti-
tioners' Brief, at 52-53: 
"It was undisputed that contributions to the Fund \Yere routinely ! 
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during the indictment period contributions to the fund· 
were often still referred to as-and actually understood' 
by some to be-{!;ssessm~_nts, or that they paid their con-
tributions "voluntarily"i71 the same sense that they paid 
their dues or other financial obligations.4 
On the other hand, the evidence also indicated that 
the political contributions by the fund were made from 
accounts strictly segregated from Union dues and assess-
collected by union stewards, foremen, area foremen, general fore-
men, or other agents of the union; that they were determined by 
a formula based upon the amount of hours or overtime hours 
worked upon a job under the jurisdiction of the union; that they 
were at one rate for 562 members and at a different rate for · 
members of other unions; that they began, continued and termi-
nated with employment on a job under the jurisdiction of the 
union; that monies of the Fund were used to provide benefits to 
union members [as well as to make political contributions]; that 
non-members were not charged any dues and assessments, including 
travel card clues in the amount of eight dollars per month ; that 
monies of the Fund were used in part to promote activities per-
mitted to the union by its Constitution and by-laws; that contribu-
tions to the Fund were only requested and received from Journey-
man Pipefitters working on jobs under the jurisdiction of Local 562, 
and not from any other classes of persons or organizations; that 
expenditures from the Fund were under the control of its director 
who was also the principal officer of the union ; and that records 
used in the collection of the contributions to the Fund were similar · 
to those employed from time to time by the union in the collection 
of its regular dues and assessments." 
4 See Appendix to Petitioners' Brief, at 197, 212; 270, 281-283; 
294; 318, 323-324; 427, 432: 457, 462; 619-621; 699; 746; 843; 
893; 903. Judge Van Oosterhout's panel opinion, adopted by the · 
majority in tlrn rehearing en bane below, 434 F. 2d 1127 (1970), 
succinctly makes the point: "It would appc:1r to be unrealistic to I 
believe such a large number of workmen would make such sub-
stantial voluntary contributions to be used for political purposes 
unless they felt that their job security required them so to do." · 
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rnents 5 and that donations to the fund were not, in fact; - -
n~essarv for employment or Union membership. The I 
fund generally required contributors to sign authorization 
cards, which contained a statement that their donations 
were "voluntary ... [ and] no part of the dues or financ-
cial obligations of Local Union No. 562 ... ," 6 and the 
testimony was overwhelming from both those who con-
~ .,,..~ 
~7, 
5 It also appears that the costs of administration of the fund, 
including the solicitation of contributions, were to some extent, 
though by no means entirely, similarly financed. See, e. g., Appen-
dix to Petitioners' Brief, at 17 (indictment apparently charging 
fund disbursements to pay for authorization cards, see n. 6, infra, 
and collection sheets); 95-96, 99. 513 (one-time fund employee 
continuing to assist in fund bookkeeping actiYities in eyenings 
and on Saturdays while on Union we.lfore fund pa>-roll): 108. 110-
111 (another employee assisting in fund bookkeeping and collection 
acth·ities while on Union ,yelfare fund payroll before becoming full-
time fund employee); 154 passim (Union agent collecting contribu-
tions on Union time); 787 (Callanan ne,·er on Union and fund pay-
rolls at same time). 
6 The authorization card read, Petitioners' Brief, at 21-22: 
"VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIO::\f AGREE.!\IENT 
"I, the undersigned , of my own free will and accord, desire to 
make regular contributions to the Political, Education, Legislat ive, 
Charity and Defense Fund which has been established and will 
be maintained by persons who are members of Loral Union No. 562. 
"I , therefore, agree to herea ft er contribute .... % per 8 hour 
da>· to said fund and authorize my contributions to be used and 
expended by those in charge of the fund, in their sole judgment 
:ind discretion, for political, educational, lcgislat iYe, ch:1rity and 
defense purposes. 
"I understand th::it contributions are Yolnntary on my part and 
that I may rc,·okc this :1greement by a written notice to that effect 
nrniled to the fund or to persons in charge thereof. I also under-
~tand that m)· contributions are no part of the dues or financial 
oblig:1tions of Loc::il Union No. 562 and tlrnt the Union has nothing 
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tributed and those who did not, as well as from the col- l 
lectors of contributions, that no specific pressure was 
exerted, and no reprisals ,rnre taken, to obtain donations! 
Significantly, the Omon's attorney who had advised in 
the organization of the fund testified on cross-examina-
tion that his advice had been that payments to the fund 
could not be made a condition of employment or Local 
562 membership, but it ,ms immaterial whether contribu-
tions appeared compulsory to those solicited.8 
Under instructions to determine whether on this evi-
dence the monies spent for political contributions by the 
7 See Appendix to Petitioners' Brief, at 171-172; 189-190; 239-
240, 2+4-245; 256, 259-260; 299, 311: 322-323; 347; 359-361, 
363-365: 382-384; 404, 411; 446; 460: 481-483; 529; 541, 543; 
554-555; 561-562; 566. 570-571 ; 572-573 ; 577-578; 581; 584-585; 
593-594 ; 600-602 : 606 : 617 ; 633-63--! ; 641 : 653 ; 5,59 ; 663 ; 
669: 685. 689; 694; 700-702; 705; 710 ; 715; 718 ; 723; 731; 
752-753; 766; 835; 840: 8+5, 847: 850: 854; 858: 860; 865-866; 
869, 871; 872: 875: 877: 887: 889; 89--!; 902: 915; 919 ; 925; 
930; 944, 947: 948: 953; 956: 962. The only contrary eYidcncc 
was the te~timon>· of William Copeland, id., nt 194-21--!, a non-
562 mcmb0r who was laid off from a job two da>·s after refusing 
to contribute when the Union ste,rnrcl explained that e,·cr>·one 
had to pa>·· A co-\\·orkcr. however, who ,ras also a non-562 mem-
ber. but paid his contributions, \\·as discharged at the same time, 
:ind although he was shortl>· thereafter put on another 562 job, 
Copeland did not return to the Union hiring hall for further work. 
::\Ioreo,·cr, Copeland acknon·lcdged on cross-ex:uninntion that he 
lrnd "strong feelings" against Loral 562 not on!>· because of the 
political fund but bernuse of an cnrlier di~missa l at anotlwr job 
im·oh·ing a jurisdictional dispute between 562 and his own union. 
8 The cros~-cxamination \Yas as follows , id .. at 1067-1068: 
"Q. ·wns it of :inr concern to you as to what the members who· 
"·ere being solicited thought about it , the atmosphere in whirh the· 
:=:olicitation was mad0, was that of nn>· concern to you? 
"A. Kone, because it made no difference as a rnattC'r of law and 
:is a matter of procedure. I "·ould lrnYe no wa~· of knowing what 
:i:=:sumptions people rc:irh. I haYe no way of knowing what people-
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fund were in reality contributors', or Union, monies,9 the 
jury found each defendant guilty. The jury also found 
specially that a ,yillful violation of § 610 was not con-
think. lily concern is what was said, \Yhat was done, and how it 
wns done. 
"Q. Well, in your opinion to [the organizers of the fund] did ~-ou 
not make it clear that in no way should it appear compulsory to 
the members who were asked to contribute? 
"A. No, sir, I did no such thin~. I simply told them that the 
contributions must not be made a condition of employment or a 
condition of Union membership and that was the e"ient of my 
advice on what they must do , what they must not do, and how 
they should do it." 
0 The court.'s instrurtions in this rrgard were as follows ( emphasis 
added): 
"You will note that Section 610 prohibits contributions by labor· 
organizations for use in connection with an election for a federal 
office. It does not prohibit any person from making or agreeing· 
to make such contributions or setting up an independent fund for 
such purpose separate and distinct from union funds either alone 
or in conjunction with others, simply because such person happens 
to be a member of a labor organization. That is, the statute is 
not violated unless the contribution is in fact and in the final 
analysis made by the labor organization. 
"In this case evidence was offered by the Government to the 
effect that funds were contributed to or in behalf of candidates 
for federa l office and that such funds were paid out upon checks 
drawn upon the Pipefitters Voluntary Political, Educational, Legis-
lative, Charity and Defense Fund. It is necessary, therefor, that 
the evidence establish that the Pipe fitters ... Fund was in fact 
a union fund, that the money therein was union money, and 
that the real contributor to the candidates was the union. As to 
this issue, the defendants contend that the fund in question was a 
bona fide entity separate and apart from the union, established 
b~- the voluntary good faith act of members of the pipefitters Local 
562 and others, from which contributions to candidates were made 
on behalf of the persons who created the fund and not on behalf 
of the union. On the other hand, the Government contends that 
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templated, and the trial court imposed sentence accord--
ingly. The Union was fined $5,000, while the individual 
defendants were each sentenced to one year imprison-
ment and fined $1,000. 
the fund was a, mere artifice or device set up by the defendants 
nnd others as a part of the alleged conspiracy to give the outward 
appearance of being an independent nnd separate entity but in 
fact constituting a part of union funds. 
"In determining whether the Pipefitters Voluntary Fund was 
a bona fide fund , separate and distinct from the union or a mere · 
nrtifice or device, you should take into consideration all the facts 
nnd circumstances in e\·idence. and in such consideration you may 
consider 
" l. Whether or not payments to the fund were routinely made 
at regular intervals at job sites, 
"2. Whether or not payments to the fund were routinely col-
lected by union stewards, foremen, area foremen, general foremen, 
or other agents of the union, 
"3. Whether or not the payment to the fund was determined· 
by a formula based upon the amount of hours or overtime hours 
worked upon a job under the supervision of the union, 
"4. Whether or not payments to the fund were at one rate for · 
562 members and at a different rate for members of other unions, 
"5 . Whether or not payments to the fund began, continued and· 
terminated with employment on a job under the jurisdiction of the · 
union,. 
"6. Whether or not monies of the fund were used to provide 
benefits to union members in their capacity as members, 
"7. Whether or not payments to the fund by members of other · 
unions were in lieu of payments to the union in the form of travel 
card dues in the amount of eight dollars per month, 
"8. Whether or not monies of the fund were used in part to 
promote activities proper!>' permitted to the union pursuant to 
Section 2.05 of its Constjtution and by-laws, 
"9. Whether or not payments to the fund were made by those 
affiliated with the union to the general exclusion of other classes 
of persons or organizations, 
"10. Whether or not contributions to the fund were required as 
70-74-0PINION 
12 PIPEFITTERS v. UNITED STATES 
On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Cir-
cuit, petitioners contended that the indictment failed to 
allege, and the evidence was insufficient to sustain, a 
a condition of employment or continued employment of member-
ship in Local 562, 
" 11. Whether or not the individuals who contributed to sa id 
fund signed a voluntary contribution agreement, 
" 12 . Whether or not the contributions to sa id fund were made 
Yohmta rily or inYoluntarily, 
"13. Whether or not the monies contributed to sa id fund were 
kept separate and distinct from the funds of Local 562, 
"14. ·whether or not some persons who "·orl~ed under the juris-
dic tion of Local 562 did not contribute to sa id fund , 
"15. Whether or not the monies of said fund were used in part 
to promote acti,·it i<'s which were prohibit C'd to Local 562 by its 
Constitution and By-Lnws, 
" 16. Whether or not sn id fund ,ms establi~hed nnd mainta ined 
pursuant to the adYice of counsel, 
"17. "\Yhether or not the moni<'S of said fund were reportC'd to 
the D C'pa rtment of Labor on the Ll\1-2 forms, which required the 
reporting of monies of Locnl ,562, 
"18. W'hether or not expenditures from the fund were under the 
cont rol of t he union and its offi cers, 
" 19. WhethN or not records usrd in the collection of the pay-
nwnts to the fund are similar to t hose employed from time to time 
b~· t he union in the collection of its regula r du C's and assessments. 
" If upon considerat ion of all the fact s and circumstances in 
e1·idence you find t hat the cont ributions to the cnndidat es for 
frderal offi ce fo r political purposes ,Yere in fac t made out of 
union funds by the union , and t hat the individual defendants as 
offirers of the union , willfull~· consented thereto, then you may 
take thi,; fact into considC'ration together with other facts in evi-
dence in dC'tcrmining whethpr there was a prior unckrstanding or 
:1grcrrnent so to do. 
" A great deal of c,·idenrc has bern introduced on the question of 
" ·hethcr t he pa ~-mcnts into the Pipefi ttN, Yolunta r~· Poli t iral, 
Educat ional, Legi,;lativc, Clrnrit>· :rnd Defrnse Fund b~· mcmbrrs 
of Lorn! 5o2 and others working unc!C' r its juri,;di rt ion were Yolunta ry 
or im·olunta ry. This evid C' nre i~ rrlernnt fo r your considerat ion, 
along wi th nil other fa cts and circumstam cs in evidence, in deter-
1V/L.J 
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conspiracy to violate § 610 and that § 610, on its face 
or as construed and applied, abridged their rights under 
the First, Fifth, Sixth , and Seventeenth Amendments and 
Art. I , § 2, of the Constitution. They argued further 
that the special finding by the jury that a willful viola-
tion of § 610 was not contemplated effectively resulted 
in acquittal, since such willfulness was an essential ele-
ment of the conspiracy under 18 U. S. C. § 371. The 
Court of Appeals in a four-to-three en bane decision, 434 
F. 2d 1127 (1970), adopted Judge Van Oosterhout's 
panel opinion rejecting each of these claims, id., at 
1116 (1970). The gist of the court's decision , insofar 
as pertinent here, was that the '151pe1'ttters fund was 
a subterfuge through which the Union made political 
contributions of Union monies in violation of § 610, as 
demonstrated by the evidence that the fund was under 
the Union's control and regularly served its purposes and 
that the donors to the fund contributed in the belief that 
their job security depended upon it. We granted cer-
tiorari. 402 U. S. 994 (1971) . 
After ,rn heard oral argument,. the President on Jan-
uary 7, 1972, signed into law the Federal Election Cam-
paign Act of 1971, "-hich in § 205 amends 18 U. S. C. 
§ 610, effective April 7. 1972.' 0 "\Ve, accordingly, re-
quested the parties to file supplemental briefs address-
ing the impact of that amendment on this prosecution.11 
mining whether the fund is a union fund. Howe\·er; the mere 
fact that the payments into the fund may haye been made volun-
ta rily by some or e\·en all of the contributors t hereto does not 
of itself, mean that the money so paid into t he fund was not 
union money." 
10 See Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, § 406, - Stat. 
- . The t ext of § 205 appea rs infra. at pp. 23- 24. 
11 The questions posed to the parties were: 
"Does § 205 of the Federal Election Ca mpaign Act of 1971 (P. L. 
92-225) affect the decision in this case, nnd if so, with whnt result ? 
:dore particulnrly, does § 205 effect a substantive change in 18 
U . S. C. § 610 in any way material to this case, as, for example, by 
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Having considered those briefs, we now hold that § 205-___ 
of the Federal Election Campaign Act merely codifies 
prior law with one important exception pertinent to this -case; that the change in the law does not, however, abate 
this prosecution; but that the judgment below must, 
nevertheless, be reversed because of erroneous jury in-
structions.12 This disposition makes decision of the con-
altering any of the attributes of permissible union political organiza-
tions, such as the method of organization or administration or the 
method of solicitation or collection of contributions? If so, mu~t this 
prosecution abate under the doctrine of United States v. The 
Schooner Peggy, 1 Cranch 103, and its progeny? Or does the fed-
eral saving statute, 1 U. S. C. § 109, nullify any abatement of the 
prosecution? In answering the latter question , what effect should 
be given to Hamm v. Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306?" 
1 " Petitioners Callanan and Lawler died pending our deci8ion .. 
The judgment of conviction will therefore be vacated as to them 
with directions to the District Court to dismiss the indictment 
against them. Durham v. United States, 401 U. S. 481 (1971). 
The remaining petitioners press the argument, rejected by the 
Court of Appeals, that the special finding by the jury that a 
willful violation of § 610 was not contemplated amounted to an 
acquittal, since such willfulness was an essential element of the 
conspiracy under 18 U. S. C. § 371. The trial court apparently 
required a special finding to determine whether the substantive· 
offense which petitioners were charged with conspiring to commit 
was a misdemeanor or a felony. See 18 U. S. C. § 610, ante, pp. 1-2. 
That, in turn, was relevant for imposing sentence under § 371. See 
n. 1, supra. Petitioners contend that § 371 punishes a conspiracy 
to commit a malum prohibitum such as § 610 on!)· when the object 
of the conspiracy is known to have been unlawful, which , so the 
argument goes, the jury found not to have been the . case here by 
.-irtue of its special finding. This argument is not persuasive. 
Petitioners not only failed to object to the trial court's requirement 
tliat the jury return a special finding but also fa iled to move for 
acquittal on the ground now offered once the specia l finding was· 
returned. l\fore important, even assuming arguendo the correct-
ness of petitioners' premise that knowledge of the reach of § 610 
was requisite for conviction, but see Keegan v. United States, 325 
U.S . 478,506 (1945) (Stone, C. J., dissenting); see generally Devel-
-i..o< ~ 
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stitutional issues raised premature, and we therefore do· 
not decide them. Cf. United States v. Auto. Workers, 
352 U.S. 167 (1957); United States v. C. I. 0., 335 U. s_ 
106 (1948). 
I 
We begin with an analysis of § 610. 
First . The parties are in agreement thatj 610, despite· 
its broad langauge, does not prohibit a labor organization 
from making, through the medium of a political fund 
orgamzed by it, contributions or expenditures in con-
nection with federal elections, so Ion as the monies ex-
pend~ ~re in SOl 1e sense volun eered by those asked to 
contribute. Thus, the Government states in its brief, 
"Nor do we dispute [petitioners'] conclusion, following 
their review of the Jegislative history of Section 610, that 
opments in the Law-Criminal Conspiracy, 72 Han-. L. Rev. 920, 
936-937 (1959), petitioners would be entitled at best to a new 
trial, not acquittal. The trial court specifically instructed the-
Jury: 
"The crime charged in this case requires proof of specifi c intent 
before a defendant can be convicted. . . . To establish specific · 
intent the Government must prove that the defendant knowingly, 
willfully and purposely did an act which the law forbids . ... 
"An act is done 'knowingly' if done voluntarily and with knowl-
edge of the facts, and not because of mistake or inadvertence or 
other innocent reason. 
"An act is done 'willfully' if done voluntarily and purposely and 
with the specific intent to do that which the law forbids; that is 
to say, with bad purpose either to disobey or to disregard the law. 
"An act is done 'unlawfu lly' if done contrary to law." Appen- -
dix to Petitioners' Brief, at 1110 (emphasis added). See also id., 
at 1116 (instruction on good-faith belief in lrgality of object of 
conspiracy). 
In view of this instruction the jury's special finding appea rs to 
have been inconsistent with its general verdict, but that, we hold, 
could require only reversal, not acquittal. But cf., e. g., Dunn v .. 
United States, 284 U. S. 390 (1932) (consist-ency in wrdict on 
separate counts unnecessa ry). 
J. .., ,r""f a """' 
4--., .... -,, ... ., ..,ax.sJ 
.., S(;- Q4,1N1enlc,., 
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a union could 'establish a political organization for the 
purpose of receiving ear-marked political monies directly 
from [ voluntary contributions of] union members ... .' " 
Brief for the United States, at 27 n. 7, quoting Petitioner's 
Brief, at 62. See also Brief for the United States, at 30. 
This construction of § 610 is clearly correct. 
The antecedents of ~ 610 have previously been traced 
in United States v. Auto. Workers and United States v. 
C. I. 0., supra. We need recall here only that the prohi-
bition in § 313 of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 
1925, 43 Stat. 1074, on contributions by corporations in 
connection ,vith federal elections was extended to labor 
organizations in the ,var Labor Disputes Act of 1943, 
57 Stat. 167, but only for the duration of the war. As 
the Court noted in CIO, supra, at 115, "It was felt that 
the influence which labor unions exercised over elections 
through monetary expenditures should be minimized, and 
that it ,vas unfair to individual union members to permit 
the union leadership to make contributions from general 
union funds to a political party which the individual 
member might oppose." The prohibition on contribu-
tions was then permanently enacted into law in § 304 
of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 61 I 
Stat. 159, "·ith the addition, however, of a proscription 
on "expenditures" and an extension of both prohibitions 
to payments in connection with federal primaries and 
political conventions as well as federal elections them-
selves. Yet neither prohibition applied to payments by' 
union political funds in connection with federal elections 
so long as the funds ,Yere financed by the knowing free-
choice donations of the union membership. Union po-
litical funds had come to prominence in the 1944 and 
1946 election campaigns and had been extensively studied 
by special committees of both the House and Senate. 
Against the backdrop of the committee findings and 
recommendations the Senate debates upon the reach of 
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source of financing of the funds. The unequivocal view 
I 
of the proponents of § 304 was that the contributions 
and expenditures of these funds did not violate that pro-
vision because the monies spent were the contributors' 
monies and not union monies. 
The special committees investigating the 1944 and 
1946 campaigns devoted particular attention to the activi-
ties of the Political Action Committee (PAC) of the 
Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) because they 
had stirred considerable public controversy. See H . .R. 
Rep. No. 2093, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-6 (1945); S. Rep. 
N"o. 101, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 20-24, 57-59 (1945); H. R. 
Rep. No. 2739, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 30-31 (1946). See 
also S. Rep. No. 1, pt. 2, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 34 (1947). 
The committee findings were that PAC had been estab-
lished by the executive board of the CIO in July 1943; 
that it consisted of a national office and 14 regional offices 
advising and coordinating numerous State and local po-
litical action committees; that its connection to the CIO 
vvas close at every level of organization ; that its pro-
gram, adopted by the CIO convention in November 1943, 
had included the re-election of President Roosevelt and 
the election of a "progressive" Congress; that it had 
initially been financed by sizeable pledges from the 
treasuries of CIO international unions and that some of 
these funds had been expended in federal primaries; but 
that, following the nomination of President Roosevelt 
for re-election in July 1944, it was generally financed by 
$1 contributions knowingly and freely made by individual 
CIO members; and that these monies were used for-
political educational activities, including get-out-the-vote 
drives, but were not directly contributed to any candidate 
or political committee. Thus, PAC had limited its direct 
contributions in federal campaigns to primaries, to which 
the Act at the time expressly did not apply, and restricted 
its activities in the elections themselves to so-called 
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Special Committee on Campaign Expenditures concluded 
in 1945 that, in these circumstances, there was "no clear-
cut violation" by PAC of § 313 of the Corrupt Practices 
Act. S. Rep. :No. 101, supra, at 23. Although there was. 
agreement ,Yithin the committee that § 313 should be ex-
tended to federal primaries and nominating conventions. 
because of their importance in determining final election 
results, id., at 81-82,1 3 there was disagreement on whether-
§ 313 should also be amended to proscribe "expenditures" 
in addition to "contributions." A majority believed that 
it should not be, in part because the amendment "·would 
tend to limit the rights of freedom of speech, freedom of 
the press, and freedom of assembly as guaranteed by the 
Federal Constitution ." Id., at 83.14 Senators Ball and 
Ferguson, who dissented from this conclusion, neverthe-
less, conceded that even as to "expenditures": "If the 
Political Action Committee had been organized on a 
voluntary basis and obtained its funds from voluntary 
individual contributions from the beginning, there could 
be no quarrel v,·ith its activities or program and in fact 
both are desirable in a democracy." Id., at 24. The 
House Campaign Expenditures Committee in 1946, how-
ever, strongly urged the adoption of a prohibition on 
"expenditures" in terms condemning the activities of 
PAC ·without regard to the source of its funds. 15 
1 3 Accord, H. R. Rep. No. 2093, supra, at 9; S. Rep. No. 1, pt. 2, 
supra, at 36. Contra, H. R. Rep. No. 2739, supra, at 46--47. 
14 The Senate committee did recommend that the use of general 
union funds to finance the distribution of a political pamphlet in 
connection with a federal election be prosecuted as a test case to 
determine the scope of the term "contribution" in § 313. Id., at 
57-59. 
15 H. R. Rep. No. 2739, supra, at 39--40, 43 , 46. The House 
committee declared, for example, id., at 43: 
"The CIO Political Action Committee is a committee of the Con-
gress of Industrial Organizations and, as such, under the Corrupt 
Practices Act, is likewise as a labor union prohibited [from] making-
,(~ 
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Then in 1947 Congress made permanent the applica-
tion of § 313 of the Corrupt Practices Act to labor organi-
zations and closed the loopholes that ·were thought to 
have been exploited in the 1944 and 1946 elections. 
These changes were embodied in § 304 of the labor bill 
introduced by Representative Hartley, which was adopted 
by the House and the conference committee with little· 
apparent discussion or opposition.16 The provision, how-
ever, provoked lengthy debate on the Senate floor when 
Senator Taft, sponsor of the Senate labor bill and one of 
the Senate conferees. sought to explain its import. That 
any contribution in connection with any election at which a Repre-
senta tve to Congress is to be elected. 
"The committee feels that whether or not the activities carried 
on by these organizations and the payment of salaries to men known 
as organizers or advisers who go into the congressional districts and 
actively assist in local campaign activities, and expenditures for · 
radio time, newspaper advertising, printing and distribution of 
handbills and posters, and for transportation of voters, constitute -
violations of the letter of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act, they 
certainly constitute violations of the spirit and intent of the law 
and the [Act] should be so amended as to clearly and distinctly 
set out that such activities are prohibited." 
The Senate committee studying the 1946 campaign joined this rec-
ommendation, but without any reference to PAC. See S. Rep. 
No. 1, pt. 2, supra, at 38-39. See also H. R. Rep. No. 2093, 
supra, at 9, 10-11 (notjng the controversy oyer the scope of the 
term "contribution" and expressing views seemingly sympathetic 
with prohibiting "expenditures") . 
16 See H. R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 46 (1947) ; 93 
Cong. Rec. 3428, 3522-3523 (1947); H. Conf. Rep. No . 510, 80th 
Cong., 1st Sess ., 67-68 (1947). See also 93 Cong. Rec. 6389 (1947) 
( critical remarks of Representative Saba th following the conference 
committee report). The only statement offering a rationale for 
§ 304 was made by Representative Robsion after the House had · 
Yoted to override President Truman's ,·eto of the Act. Robsion 
stressed that it was unfair to union members to allow the expendi-
ture of union funds in support. of candidates for federal office whom 
they opposed. See 93 Cong. Rec. 7492 (1947). 
20 
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debate compellingly demonstrates that union political \ 
funds were clearly recognized as permissible so long as 
they were financed by knowing free-choice contributions. 
Thus, Senator Taft stated: 
"[I] t seems to me the conditions are exactly parallel, 
both as to corporations and labor or amzations. 
[ n associat10n o manu acturers receiving corpora-
tion funds and using them in an election would vio-
late the law, in my opinion, exactly as the PAC, if 
it got its fund from labor unions, would violate the 
law. If the labor people should desire to set up a I 
political organization and obtain direct contributions 
for it, there would be nothing unlawful in that. If 
the National Association of Manufacturers, we will 
say, wanted to obtain direct contributions for a series 
of advertisements, then, just as in the case of PAC, 
it could take an active part in a political campaign ." 
93 Cong. Rec. 6439 (1947) (emphasis added). 
In response to a question by Senator Magnuson whether 
unions would be prohibited from publishing a newspaper 
"favoring a candidate, mentioning his name, or endorsing 
him for public office," Taft continued: 
"No; I do not think it means that. The union 
can issue a newspaper, and can charge the members 
for the newspaper, that is, the members who buy 
copies of the newspaper, and the union can put such 
matters in the nmvspaper if it wants to. The union 
can separate the payment of dues from the payment 
for a newspaper if its members are willing to do so, 
that is, if the members are willing to subscribe to 
that kind of a newspaper. I presume the members 
would be willing to do so. A union can publish such I 
a newspaper, or unions can do as was done last year, 
organize something life the PAC, a political organiza-
tion, and receive direct contributions, just so long as 
J 
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members of the know what the are con-
tr'i5utingco," an e ues w ic t ey pay into the 
union treasury are not used for such purpose." Id. , 
at 6440 (emphasis added). 
When Magnuson rejoined that "all union members know 
that a part of their dues in these cases go for the publica-
tion of some labor [newspaper] organ," Taft concluded: 
"Yes. How fair is it? vVe will assume that 60 
percent of a union's employees are for a Republican 
candidate and 40 percent are for a Democratic candi-
date. Does the Senator think the union members 
should be forced to contribute, without being asked 
to do so specifically, and without having a right to 
withdraw their payments, to the election of some-
one ,vho they do not favor? Assume the paper 
favors a Democratic candidate whom they oppose or 
a Republican candidate whom they oppose. Why 
should they be forced to contribute money for the 
election of someone to whose election they are op-
posed? If they are asked to contribute directly to 
the support of a newspaper or to the support of a 
labor political organization, they know what their 
money is to be used for and presumably approve 
it. From such contribution the organization can 
spend all the money it wants to with respect to such 
matters. But the prohibition is against labor unions 
using their members' dues for political purposes, 
which is exactly the same as the prohibition against 
l 
a corporation using its stockholders' money for po-
litical purposes, and perhaps in violation of the 
wishes of many of its stockholders." Ibid. (empha-
sis added). See also id., at 6437, 6438. .. \\ 
Senator Taft's view that the knowing free-choice do-
nations of unio11 members to a political fund are the 





22 PIPEFITTERS v . UNITED ST ATES 
in spending them cannot violate § 610, follmYed an inter-
pretat1011 given by the Atton1ey General in 1944 to the 
War Labor Disputes Act. In a letter to Senator E. H. 
Moore of Oklahoma the Attorney General had advised 
that contributions by voluntarily financed union political 
funds are not contributions by labor organizations within 
the intendment of the Act, fundamentally because the 
funds serve merely as conduits for the voluntary dona-
tions of individual union members. 1 ' Moreover, Senator I 
Taft's vievv reflected concern that a broader application 
of § 610 might raise constitutional questions of invasion 
of First Amendment freedoms, and he wished particularly 
to reassure colleagues who had reservations on that score 
and whose votes " ·ere necessary to override a predictable 
presidential veto, see 93 Cong. R ec. 7485 (1047) , of the 
17 See letter from Attorney General Biddle t o Senator l\Ioore 
(Sept. 23, 1944) ( emphasis added) , reproduced in Department of 
Justi ce Press Release, Sept . 25, 1944, and noted in 4 Law. Guild 
R ev. No. 5, a t 49 (1944): 
"You also point ou t [the Attorney General wrote] t hat commit-
tees composed of members of unions are engaged in the solici-
tation of funds from indiYidual union members and you assert 
that committees of this kind 'are as much a labor organization 
as a union organization itself.' This contention is inconsistent 
with the provisions of the statute. In amending section 313 of 
the Corrupt Practices Act, the [vVar Labor Dispu tes Act ] pro-
vided that for the purposes of the amendment the words 'labor 
organization' should have the same meaning t hey have under 
the National Labor Relations Act . . . . I think it clear that com-
mittees of the kind that you describe are not labor organizations 
within the meaning of this definition and they would not be recog-
nized as bargaining agencies by the National Labor Relations Board. 
E ven if it were true that these committees were identical with the 
labor organizatiom to which their members belong-which I believe \ 
not to be the fact-there would still be no violation of law because 
the statute applies to contributions made by labor organizations and 
in this case the contributions are made by individuals and not by 
the committees ." 
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Labor Management Relations Act.' 8 We conclude ac-
cordingly that l!j.s view of the limited reach of § 610, en-
titled in any event to great weight, is in this instance con--trolling. Cf. Newspaper Pub. Assn. v. NLRB, 345 U.S. 
irni,"To7-111 (1953); Bus Employees v. Wisconsin Board, 
340 u. s. 383, 392 11. 15 (1951). We therefore hold that 
§ 610 does not apply to union contributions and expendi-
tures from Jolitical funds donated by union member f -their OJ..v:n free and knowing choice. f. United States v .. 
Auto. Workers, supra, at 59'2; United States v. CIO, 
supra, at 123. 
-r '-+ +- 's 
~ . ,, ··~~ 
(9~ 





Section 205 of the Federal Election Campaign Act 
confirms this conclusion by adding at the end of § 610 
the following paragraph: 
"As used in this section, the phrase 'contribution 
or expenditure' shall include any direct or indirect 
payment, distribution, loan, advance, deposit, or gift 
of money, or any services, or anything of value ( ex-
cept a loan of money by a national or State bank 
made in accordance with the applicable banking laws 
and regulations and in the ordinary course of busi-
ness) to any candidate, campaign committee, or po-
litical party or_ organization, in connection with any 
election to any of the offices referred to in this sec-
tion; but shall not include communication by a 





by a labor organizatlon to its members and their 
families on any subject; nonpartisan registration and 
get-out-the-vote campaigns by a corporation aimed 
1 8 See, e. g., 93 Cong. Rec. 6448, 6522-6523 (1947) (exchange 
between Senator Pepper, who, in opposing § 304, decried it as 
Republican legislation in contravention of the First Amendment, 
and Senator Ellender, who rose, as a Democratic representatiYe on 
the conference committee, in support of Senator Taft's construc-
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at its stockholders and their families, or by a labor 
organization aimed at its members and their families; 
the establishment, administration, and solicitation o.f 
co~ a separate segregated fund to be 
utilized for political purposes by a corporation or I 
labor organization: Provided, That it shall be un-
lawful for .,§Eh a fund to make a contribution .or 
ex~enditure by utiligi1w nion<[JJ or anything of value 
sec~ ~ physical force, job discrimination, finan-
cial reprisals, or the threat of force, job discrimina-
tion, or fi1{ancial reprisal; or bi1.'due§_, fees, or other 
monies required as a cond7iio;i oTm,embership in a 
labor organization or as a conclitwn of employment, 
or by monies obtained in any commercial transac-
tion." - Stat. -- (emphasis added). 
This amendment stemmed from a proposal offered by 
RepresentatiYe Hansen on the House floor, see 117 Cong. 
Rec. H 11476, to " ·hich the Senate acquiesced in con-
ference. See id., at H 12474 (joint conference com-
mittee report). Hansen stated that the ~e of his 
proposal was, with one except.ion not pertinent here/n 
"to codify court decisions interpreting [and the legislative 
history eiplicating] =;ction 610 .. . and to spell out in 
more detail what a labor union or corporation can or 
cannot do in connection with a Federal election." 20 
Moreover, there \\"as substantial agreement among his. 
colleagues that the effect of his amendment was, in fact, 
rn The exception im·oh·ed "·bether nonpartisnn registrat ion and 
gct-out-thP-Yote campaigns could be direrted to the public at large. 
See id., at H 11477, H 11478, H 11488. 
00 Id ., at H 11477. Sec abo 118 id., at H 94. In determining-
that § 610 has ahrnys permitted unions to organize political funds 
fina need b~- knowing free-choice donations, Harn,en relied, as we 
hnYe done, on Senator Taft 's floor explanation of § 30-! of the 
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mere codification and clarification,"' and even those who 
dfsagreed did not dispute that =union political funds fi-
nanced by the ·nowin';1ree-cMic€contributio1~0 · union 
members do not violate § 610. n ee , epresentative 
Crane, ,Yho led the opposition to the Hansen amend-
ment,"" had himself written the House committee provi-
sion for which the Hansen amendment was substituted. 23 
Mr. Crane's provision, like the Hansen amendment, was 
said in some measure to codify existing law/4 and would 
also have specifically authorized voluntarily financed 
union political funds. "" This consensus that has now 
21 See, e. g., 117 id., nt. H 11479 (remarks of Representative 
Hn~·s) , H 11481-H 11482 (remnrks of Representative Thompson) , 
H 11486 (remnrks of Representatives Steiger and Gude); 118 id., at 
H 91 (remarks of Representntirn Devine) . 
02 See 117 id., at H 11480, H 11483-H 11484, H 11486, H 11488; 
118 id., at H 88-H 89. 
"
3 The Hansen proposnl was offered as nn amendment to nn 
amendment in the nature of a substitute tu the bill as reported 
out of committee. Although the substitute amendment had no 
proYi~ion relnt ing to § 610; see 117 id., nt H 11564, it was expected 
tlrnt the Crane proYision "·ould be taken up as an nrnendment to 
the substitute amendment if the Hnnsen amendment failed to carry. 
See, e. g., id., at H 11487-H 11488 (rernnrks of Representath·es 
De\·ine and Crane). 
24 See, e. g., id .. at H 11487 (remarks of RepresentatiYe DeYine) . 
20 The Crane pro\·ision \rnuld haxe added the following paragraph 
at the end of § 610: 
"As used in this section, the phrase 'contribution or expenditure' 
shall include any direct or indirect pa~·ment , distribution; loan , ad-
Yance, deposit , or gift , of mone~·, or an~- sen ·ices, or an~·thing of 
nlue to anr candidate, compaign [sic] committee, or political party 
or organization, in connection with any election to any of the 
offices referred to in this section, including any expenditure in con-
nection with get-out-the-vote activities. Nothing in this section 
shall preclude an organization from establishing and administering 
a separate contributory fund for any political purpose, including 
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been captured in express terms in § 610 cannot, of courser 
by itself conclusively establish what Congress had in 
mind in 1947. But it does " 'throw a cross light' " on I 
the earlier enactment that, together with the latter's. 
legislative history, demonstrates beyond doubt the cor-
rectness of the parties' common ground of interpretation 
of § 610. Michigan Nat. Bank v. Michigan, 365 U. S. 
467, 481 (1961) (quoting L. Hand, J.). Cf. NLRB v. 
Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U. S. 175, 194 (1967); 
l\TLRB v. Drivers Local Union, 362 U. S. 274, 291-292 
(1960). 
Second. Where the litigants part company is in defin-
ing precisely when the monies in a union political fund 
are to be regarded as the contributors' monies and not 
those of the union, so as to bring contributions and ex-
gifts, or payments to such fund are made freely and voluntarily, 
and ai·e unrelated to dues, fees, or other moneys required as a· 
condition of membership in such organization or as a condition of 
employment." H. R . Rep. No. 92-564, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. , 19 
(1971) (emphasis different). 
The principal bone of contention between the proponents and 
opponents of the Hansen amendment when it was first introduced 
was on whether union or corporation treasuries could and should be· 
arnilable to finance get-out-the-vote drives. Representative Frenzel, 
for example, summarized the debate shortly before the House vote 
on the Hansen amendment " ·as taken, 117 Cong. Rec. H 11488: 
"[l]t is important that we understand neither the Crane amend-
ment nor the Hansen amendment is directed toward Yoluntnry or 
COPE [the successor of PAC] moneys. What we are talking about 
is Treasury money. The principal distinction is tlrn,t the Hansen 
amendment would allow its use to get-out-the-vote drives for 
union members while the Crane amendment would not." 
Following the conference committee report , Crane rose once again 
in opposition to the Hansen amendment, this time and for the 
first time criticizing the amendment in its treatment of union politi-
cal funds. The dispute centered then, however , not on whether 
Yoluntary funds were permissible, but on exactly what their pre-
requisites were. See pp. 36-39, infra. 
~~ . 
~~~) 
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penditures by the fund outside the ambit of § 610. The 
Government maintatrr,\ first , that a valid fund may rn;i t 
be the alter e o of ~ sponsorin union in the sense of 
being dominate y i an serving its purposes, regard-
less of the fund's source of financing: 
"Section 610 was violated [ the Government ex-
plains] if in fact the [Pipefitters] Fund was merely 
a subterfuge through which the union itself made 
\ 
proscribed political contributions, irrespective of 
whether the moneys so contributed we;:;' voluntarily 
given to the'"':runct5y the contnl5utors. . . . [T]he 
evidence that the payments were voluntary [ was 
only a factor relevant] in determining if it was the 
union or the Fund as a separate entity that made 
the political contributions in question .... " Brief 
for the United States in Opposition to the Petition 
for Certiorari, at 7. See also Brief for the United 
States, at 24, 32. 
I The requirement that the fund be separate from the ~. ~ sponsoring union eliminates, in the Government's view, 
~v- / "the corroding effect of money employed in elections by 
aggregated power," United States v. Auto. Workers, supra, 
at 582, ,vhich this Court has found to be one of the dual 
pur.E2,.S£!' underlying § 610. See id., passim; United 
Sta~es ·. C. I. 0., supra, at 113, 115. The Government 
urg s condly, that in accordance with the legislative 
inte ; o protect minorilY inJ_E~[ ests from overbearing 
union leadership, which we have found to be the other 
purpose of § 610, ibid., the fund may not be financed by 
monies actually required fo · union mem-
bership or from pa ents that are effectively as ~ ed, 
that is, solicited i circumstances inherent! 
"
6 "A union member [t~~~~Wl!~ ~~.s.L.!JJ.il.¥,J,•"'l'ffc 
ble the union's demand-through its steward on the jobsitc-for 
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Petitioners, on the other hand, contend that, to be valid, 
a political fund need not be distinct from the sponsoring 
union, and further that § 610 permits the union to exer-
cise institutional pressure, much as recognized charities 
do, in soliciting donations. See Petitioners' Brief, at 71, 
73 n. 22. 
We think that neither side fully accurately portrays 
the attri~ s of legitimate political funds. • We hold 
that sucCa,lfund must be separate from the spo~g 
u~n 9~ in the sense that there must be a strict segre-
gation o \ ts monies from union dues and assessments. 27 
We hold , too, ~ lthough solicitation by union officials 
is permissible,c\ ,~ h solicitation must be conducted under 
circumstances plainly indicating that donations are for a 
political purpose and that those solicited may cle@:ine 
to contribute without ]oss of job, union membership, or 
any other reprisal within the union's institutional power. 
Thus, "'tWlri.r with the second half of the Goverml_lent's I 
po~ on, but rejiEJfie first. 
As Senator Taft's remarks quoted above indicate, ante, 
pp. 20-21, the test of voluntariness under § 610 focuses 
on whether th econ tribu tions solicited for political use 
ar~1 knowing free-choice donations." The dominant con-
cern in requiring tEat contnbutions be voluntary " ·as, 
after all, to protect the dissenting stockholder or union 
I 
member. Whether the solicitation scheme is designed to 
inform him of the political nature of the fund and his 
freedom to refuse support is, therefore, determinative. 
monc? ea rned. Section 610 reduces this instirutional pressure by 
forbidding the unions from making direct political contributions 
from money that is effecti,·ely ass<'s~ed." Brief for the United 
States, at 38. As we shall see, infra, at pp. 48-55, the Go,-ernmcnt '~ 
theory in prosecuting this case focused on the first , but not the 
second of its a rguments here presented. 
" 7 For the scope of t he required segregnt ion of fund,;, see pp. 41-
45. infra . 
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Nowhere, however, has Congress indicated that the / 
political organization has to be formally or functionally 
i.::9ependent of union control ~ that union officials are 
barred from soliciting contributions or even precluded 
from determining how the monies raised will be spent. 
The Government's argument to the contrary in the I 
first half of its position is based on a mis.µnderstand-
ing of the purposes of § 610.w When Congress pro-
w The Gowrnmcnt relies on United States v. Lewis Food Co., 
366 F. 2d 710 (1966) , where the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit. upheld nn indictment under § 610 that foiled to allege, 
inter alia, that an expenditure b_\· a cor'poration in connection with 
a federal election wns made against the wishes of an individual 
stockholder . The court there explained, id., at 713-714: 
"The statute itself ... does not proYide an exception when stock-
holders consent. ·w e arc of the opinion that Congre.ss intended 
to insure ngainst officers proceeding in surh matters without obtain-
ing the consent of shareholders b_v forbidding nll such expenditures. 
"The Supreme Court stated that the otlH'r legislatiYe motirntion 
r in addit ion to the protection of minority interests l for enactment 
of legislation such ns section 610 was the necessity for destroying 
the influenc-c oYer elect ions which corpor.1tions exercised through 
financial contributions. [United States v. CIO, 335 U. S., at 113.J 
This ('onsideration would be meaningless if a corporat ion could make 
expenditmes for actiYitics otherwise forbidden b_v sect ion 610 b_\· 
simply obtaining unanimous consent of its stockholders. In the 
Auto Workers case, t he indictment contained no allegation that the 
expenditure of union funds [to finance television broadcasts designed 
to influence the electornte at large] ,ms contrary to the wish of 
members. NeYertheless, the Supreme Court found the indictment 
8uflicient ." 
The Ninth Circuit's reliance on Auto. Workers was misplaced. The 
indictment there did allege, as we noted, 352 U. S., at 584, "'that 
the fund used came from the Union's dues, was not obtained b_\· 
Yoluntary political contributions or subscriptions from members of 
the Union, and was not paid for b_\' advert ising or sales.'" In 
Auto. Workers, therefore. we had no occasion to nddress the legiti-
macy of union-controlled political contributions financed from the 
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hibited labor organizations from making contribu-
tions or expenditures in connection ,Yith federal elec-
tions, it was, of course, concerned not only to protect 
minority interests within the union but to eliminate the 
effect of aggregated ,Yealth on federal elections. But the I 
aggregated wealth it plainly had in mind was the general 
union treasury-not the funds donated by union mem-
bers of their o,vn free and kno,Ying choice. Again, Sen-
ator Taft adamantly marntamed that such monies were 
the members' monies, not union monies prohibited from 
being expended in connection with federal elections. 
Indeed, Taft clearly espoused the union political organi-
zation merely as an alternative to permissible direct po-
litical action by the union itself through publications 
endorsing candidates in federal elections. The only con-
ditions for such direct electioneering were that the costs 
of publication be financed through individual subscrip-
tions rather than through union dues and that they be 
recognized by the subscribers as political organs that they 
could refuse to purchase. 30 Neither the absence of even I 
a formally separate organization, the solicitation of sub-
the court in L ewis labored under the same misapprehension on which 
t he Government's argument rests her-e--namely, that the legisla-
t i\·e purpose to eliminate the effects of aggregated wealth on federal 
elections reaches union- or corporation-controlled contributions 
and expenditures financed not from the general treasury, but from 
voluntary donations. 
By saying this, \re do not mean to suggest that the result in 
L ewis was incorrect. To the contrary, an indictment that alleges 
a contribution or expenditure from the general treasury of a union 
or corporation in connection with a federal election states an offense. 
See 1111. 48 and 49, infra. The unanimous vote of the union mem-
bers or stockholders may at most (but we need not no\r decide) be 
a defense. 
30 In United States \". CIO, supra, this Court, of course, went 
further than Senator Taft's comments would allow by holding 
t hat § 304 did not bar a union from using union fund~ to publish 
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scriptions by the union, nor the method for choosing the 
candidates to be supported was mentioned as being mate-
rial. Similarly, the only requirements for permissible po- \ 
litical organizations were that they be funded through 
~
separate contributions and that they be recognized by the 
d~ rs as political organizations to which they could 
refuse support. As Taft said, ante, at pp. 20--21, "If the 
labor people should desire to set up a political organiza-
tion and obtain direct contributions for it, there would be 
nothing unlawful in that," "just so long as the members 
of the union know what they are contributing to, and 
the dues which they pay into the union treasury are not 
used for such purpose." 
The operations of PAC, the organization that domi-
nated the congressional investigations of the 1944 and 
1946 campaigns and that was expressly approved by the 
80th Congress, are especially instructive in this regard. 
Significantly, it was exactly the knowing free-choice ~ I 
donation test of voluntariness that PAC )t soliciting con- i-
tributions sought scrupulously to observe. Sidney Hill-
man, Chairman of PAC, testified before the House Cam-
paign Expenditures Committee in 1944: 
"[W] e have utilized every avenue to tell the people 
not to become overenthusiastic about collections. 
We want this contribution on a voluntary basis and 
would rather have no contribution than to have any 
taint of coercion or even any interference. We do-
not want any money except from those who want to 
see the reelection of Roosevelt." 31 
tomed to rece1vmg it, that urged union members to vote for a 
candidate for Congress. The Court, however, arrived at that 
construction only because the contrary interpretation would create 
"the gravest doubt" of the statute's constitutionality. 335 U. 8., at 
121. 
31 Hearings before the Committee to Investigate Campaign Expend-
itures on H. Res. 511, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., 79 (1944). See also 
id., at lG--17, 77. PAC's method of collection of contributions-
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PAC was, nevertheless, generally regarded not as a func-
tionally separate orga.nization ( except for its method of 
financing 32), but as an instrumentality of the CIO, 
itself subsumed within the definition of "labor organi-
zation." 3 ~ It was, as we have seen, established by 
appears, in large measure, to have been true to Hillman's words, 
since both its political and rnluntary nature were welt known. 
See id., at 51, 844-845, 851, 864-866, 871, 880, 88,5-886, 928, 935-
936, 941, 946, 962, 964, 988. 999, 1017, 1022-1031, 1033-1038, 
1041. In some instances complaints were lodged that pressure had 
been ·exercised in obtaining donations, see id .. at 76-79, 712-713, 
728-729, 800--801, 822-823, 886, 920--924, and the House committee 
noted in its report tk1t in C::difornia some PAC monies were 
taken direct]~· from union treasuries and that "at least one local 
union ... upon vote b~· its entire member~hip levied an a~sess-
ment. of 25 cents per month upon each member .... " H. R . Rep. 
No. 2093 , supra, at 5-6. This, neverthele~s, was rerognized as an 
exception from "the gener;d national plan" following Roosc\·elt's nom-
ination for re-elertion, under which PAC was genernlly financed by 
indi\·idual contributions "large]~· ... taken b~- shop stewards outside 
working hours." Id., at 5. Indeed, the amount of indi\·idual con-
tributions actually collected by PAC e\·idcncc~ that it rnccessfully 
informed CIO members that donations were not rnand:1tor~· assess-
ments. From an estimated CIO membership of firn million PAC 
might ha\·e collected S5 miJJion at the requested rate of SI a mem-
ber. Y ct the national PAC office, which recei\·ed 50¢ of each $1 
donated. obtained on]~, $376,910.77 in 1944, S. Rep. No. 101 , supra, 
at 23, suggesting contributions by less than 800.000 CIO members. 
Accord, L. O\·eracker, Presidential Campaign Funds 61 (1946). 
32 Sec pp. 41-43, infra. 
'
3 Indeed. in a letter to regional PAC directors. the national PAC 
office itself referred to the organization "as an inst rnmentality of 
the Congress of Indu~trial Organizations." S. Rep. No. 101 , supra, 
at 22. Sec also Hearing before the Sprcial Committee to Im·cstigate 
Presidential, Yice Pre;:idential , and Senatorinl Campaign Expendi-
tures on S. Res. 263. 78th Cong.; 2d Ses;: .. 19 (1944) (tr~timony of 
Sidne>· Hillman) ("We just speak and act for thr C. I. 0. organiza-
tions."); House Hearings , supra, 11. 31, at 839-840 (trstirnon>· of 
state PAC chairman) (!oral PAC is agent of union local). It is trur 
that Senator Taft stated at one point in the Senate debates that I 
" [ t] he PAC is a separate organization which raises its own funds 
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the executive board of the CIO, its program was 
adopted at the national CIO convention, and its re-
lationship to the CIO was close at every level of 
organization." Furthermore, union agents generally l 
collected contributions, H. R. Rep. No. 2093, supra, at 5, 
and the union leadership was instrumental in choosing 
candidates to be supported."" Thus, far from being a 
for political purposes, nnd does so perfectly properly." 73 Cong. 
Rec. 6437 (1947) ( emphasis ndded). But if meant to indicate 
nnything more than thnt PAC had a sepn ratc formal identity from 
the CIO, this isolated statement was clearly inconsistent with well-
known facts about the organization. Moreornr, neither Taft nor 
any of his colleagues appe:us to han attached any particular sig-
nificance to it. Nor can we in view of Taft's endorsement of direct 
union electioneering through politicnl newspapers paid for by the 
subscribers . See pp. 3(}-31 , ante. It is also true that the Attorney 
General in his letter to Senntor Moore in 1944 opined that com-
mittees like PAC were not "lnbor organizations" within the mean-
ing of the War Labor Disputes Act innsmu ch as they were not 
bargaining ngenries. Sec n. 17, sitpra. But the Senate campaign 
expenditures committee implicitly in 1945 and the House rom-
mittee expressly in 19-!6 rejected that conclusion. See S. Rep . 
Xo. 101 , supra. nt 23: H . R. R ep. No. 2739, supra. nt 43 (quoted 
in n. 1-5, supra). Sec also House Henrings, n . 31, supra, at 27 
(\\·hethcr PAC \\·as a "lnbor orgm1ization" "high]~· clebntable" in 
opinion of PAC counsel). 
R
1 The House rommittcc obsen-ed in its 1945 report, H. R. Rep. 
::'Jo . 2093, supra. at 5: 
"The relationship brtween the Politiral Action Committre and 
the Congress of Indust rial Orgnnization!' is . . . rlo,;e on e,·rr)· le,-ef 
of organization. ?\Ir. Hillmnn is pre~iclent of the Amalgamated 
Clothing Workers of America, as well as chairman of the Political 
Action Committee. The Stnte poli t ica l nction committees t)·pically 
utilize the exist ing mechanism of the Congress of Tnclustrinl Organi-
zations State councils ; and the !oral political act ion committees are 
simila r!)· set up ns committees of the Congress of Indust rial Organi-
zations locals." 
~
5 The nationnl PAC organization did not endorse senatorial, 
congressional, Stnte, or loca l cnnclidn tes, but gnyc ach·ice to State 
nnd local political action rommittees when consulted in that regard. 
The nntional organization did endorse President Roosevelt on 
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separate organization sprouting from the desires of the 
1".ai1k and file to engage m political action , PAC, the 
Pfil._agon m11on pohhcal fund, was a medium fur org~ 
ized labor, conceived and administered by union offi~ials, 
to )Ursue through the p0Ht1cal forum the oals of the 
,vorkm man. n e on y prerequisite for its con-
tinue operation after enactment of § 304 of the Labor 
Management Relations Act was that it be strictly fi-
nanced by contributions from donors acting on their own 
free and knowing choice. 
May 17, 1944, when, in the ,rnrds of Sidney Hillman, "substan-
t ially all of the C. I. 0. international unions and the great majority 
of its State councils had already acted." The national organization 
also endorsed Vice President Truman. Candidates for Congress 
were apparently chosen for endorsement by State or local PAC 
committees composed of representatives of the internat ional CIO 
unions after review of incumbents' voting records in consultation 
with the regional PAC offices. See generally S. Rep. No. 101, supra, 
at 21; Senate Hearing, supra, n. 33 , at 12-13, 20-22; House Hear-
ings, supra, n. 31 , at 8, 39-41, 43-46 , 709-712, 714-715, 725-728, 
834-844, 896-898, 904, 906-908, 942-944, 949-950, 955, 977, 959-
960, 978-979, 984, 993-995, 1001, 1003, 1006-1007. PAC's endorse-
ment procedures were described in 1951 as follows: The chairman 
of the local political action committee, who was usually the union 
president, would consult \Yith a. prospective candidate and even-
tually bring him before a screening committee. If that committee 
acted favorably, the candidate would then be presented to the 
political action committee for a vote on formal endorsement. Any 
endorsement would then be reported to the constituent unions 
of the local PAC and to the state and national PAC offices, and 
activity in support of the candidate would get underway. J. Kroll, 
The CI0-PAC and how it works, in The House of Labor 120, 122-
125 (.T. Hardman and M. Neufeld, eds. 1951) . 
30 Accord, 0veracker, supra, n. 31, at 61-62: 
"Although the political action committee of the CI0 was sepa-
rately organized, and in most cases ns separate identity was 
scrupulously preserved, it is hard to escape the conclusion that it 
was the alter ego of the organization which inspired it. The cir- \ 
ctii'nstances under wl11ch 1t came mto Bemg, the 1mterlocking of 
directorates' at the top, and the close cooperation at the local 
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This conclusion, too, we find confirmed by § 205 of 
the Federal Election Campaign Act, ante, pp. 23-24. 
That provision exrressly; authorizes "the establishment, 
administration , and solicitation of contributions to a seI!,: 
arate segregated fund to be utilized for political purposes 
by a corporat10n or labor organization . . . ." The pro-
vision then states in a proviso clause that "it shall be 
unlawful for such a fund to make a contribution or 
expenditure by utilizing money or anything of value 
secured by physical force, job discrimination, financial 
reprisals, or the threat of force, job discrimination, or· 
financial reprisal; or by dues, fees , or other monies re-
quired as a condition of membership in a labor organi-
zation or as a condition of employment .... " Thus, 
§ 205 plainly permits union officials to establish, ~in-
ister, and solicit contributions for a political fund. The · 
conditions for that activity are that the fund be "sep,; 
~te" and "segregated" and that its contributions and 
expenditures not be financed through physical force, 
job discrimination, or financial reprisal or the "threat" 
thereof or through "dues, fees, or other monies required 
as a condition of membership in a labor organization or 
as a condition of employment." The uoted language 
is admittedly subject to contrary interpreta 10ns. ep-
J ;:?~~~~~i~,~:,::~:i!i::~ c::::E=:~~e~E~~~. 
~ only to the expression of an actual intention to inflict 
injury; and "dues, fees, or other monies required as a 
condition of membership in a labor organization or as 
a condition of employment" could be interpreted to 
mean only actual dues or assessments. But we think 
that the legislative history of § 205 establishes that ~--------:-,..::__.,.,. 
"separate" is synonymous 1\·ith "segregated" ; that 
i 
"threat:":-r:incl~ the creation of an a ~ )earance of an 
i 1t~ to infl~ ur-x~~ven ~vit 1~~ t a d~~gn to c; .rr; it 
out; an that "dues, fees, or other monies required as 
~,; '+1 
(otD, 
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a c..Q11dition of- membership in a labor organizatio_n or as 
a conclitio1i-of employment~ includes contributions effec-
tivel~ sscssecl even if not actually required for enlp}oy-
rnent or unin:n membership. 
The !i£JJ~arnenclment was an alternative to Repre-
sentative C~ e's proposal, " ·hich declared in relevant 
part, n. 25, supra: 
"Nothing in this section shall preclude an organi-
zation from establishing and administering a sepa-
rate contributory fund for any political purpose ... , 
if all contributions, gifts, or payments to such fund 
are made freely and voluntarily, and are unrelated 
to dues, fees, or other moneys requirea as a condi-
tion of membership in such organization or as a 
condition of employment." (Emphasis added.) 
The debate on the differences between the Crane and 
Hansen provisions did not involve this language when 
the Hansen amendment was first introduced and adopted 
by the House. See ibid. At that point Hansen merely 
indicated in general expla.nation of his amendment that 
a permissible fund had to be "separate," which in con-
text clearly meant "segregated," see 117 Cong. Rec. 
H 11477,37 and that, a.lthough the law could not "control 
the mental reaction" of a union member solicited by 
his union chief, id. , at H 11478,38 the monies of the fund 
3 7 "This fund [Hansen stn1 ed] must be separatf' from an~· union 
or corporate fu nds, a nd contribu t ions must be rnJunta r~·- To 
insure that con tributions nre volunta r~-, the amendment p rohibits 
t he uoe by t he separ ate politica l fund of any money or a n~·t hing 
of Y::due obtn in eel b~- 1 he use or t hre,1t of fo rce, _i ob di~criminat ion,, 
or fin ancial reprisn l, or by clues or fees, or ot her moneys required 
as a condi t ion of emplo~·ment or mcmber~hip in a lnbor organ iza-
tion .. . . 1' (Emphasis added.) 
:is "The essentinl prerequisit e [Ifo n~en sa id l for the n tli clity of 
such polit ical funds is t hat t he contribution., to t hem be rnluntn ry. 
F or t hat reason t he fin al sect ion of t his amendment makes it a 
Yiolation of section 610 to use physirnl fo rce, job discrimination, 
~w 
~ ¼12,.~i-. 4.w 
.J._ J4.,,.,, ~ ..... ,., '"'-' 'TD .v..zr..,;. 
a Um :d D ' 
S: •4-< 'J ? ' l i' 
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had to come "in a truly voluntary manner and without 
the employment of the kinds of threats or reprisals or 
other methods that are prohibited by this amendment." 
Id., at H 11479. Thus interpreted, the Hansen amend- \ 
ment in its author's vie,v served the traditional purposes 
of § 610: 
"[T]he underlying theory of section 610 [Hansen 
explained] is that substantial general purpose 
treasuries should not be diverted to political pur-
poses, both because of the effect on the political 
process of such aggregated ,vea.lth and out of con-
cern for the dissenting member or stockholder. Ob-
viously, neither of these considerations cuts against 
allowing voluntary political funds. For no one who I ~~ 
objects to the organization's politics has to_!~nd his 
support, and the money collected is that mtended 
by those who contribute to be used for political 
purposes and not money diverted from another 
source." Id., at H 11478. 
No one at this time disputed that the Crane and Hansen ) · I 
provisions ,rnre the same in these respects in codifying 
prior law. 
After the conference committee had adopted the Han-
sen amendment, however, Crane inserted in the record 
a Wall Street Journal article suggesting that the Hansen 
financial reprisa ls or the threat thereof, in seeking contributions. 
This is intended to insure that a sol icitor for COPE or BIPAG 
[union political funds] cannot abuse his organizational authority in 
seeking political contributions. Of course, nothing ran completely 
erase some residual effects on this score, an~· more than the law 
ran control the mental reaction of a bu~incs~man asked for a 
contribution by :m individual who happens to be his banker, or 
of a farmer approached by the head of his loca l form organization. 
The proper approach , and the one adopted here, is to prO\·ide 
the strong assurance that a refusal to contribute will not lead to-
reprisals and to lea \·e the rest to the independence and good sense 
of each indi\·idual." 
38 
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amendment had been inspired by the AFL-CIO to over-
rule the Court of Appeals' decision in this case by author-
izing a union political fund even if it is not separate 
and distinct from the sponsoring union and by altering 
the test of voluntariness to focus on the absence of 
force rather than on the contributor's intent to make 
a donation of his own free and knowing choice. See 
118 id., at H 88-H 89."9 Crane did not significantly 
elaborate on the article or specifically endorse each of 
the particular points it made. 
Hansen rejoined that he "[stood] behind every word 
of the statement" he had made during the earlier debate 
on his amendment and repeated "that the J,WrJ2,2¥e and 
effect of my amendment is [sic] to codify and clarify ll 
the existing law and not to make any substantive changes 
in the law." Id., at H 94.4° He sta.ted further that his 
"amendment is consistent with the position taken by 
the Justice Department in the brief it filed with the 
U. S. Supreme Court in the Pipefitter case [ which 
charged that the contributions to the Pipefitters fund 
39 In particular; the article quoted "a man at the Justice Depart-
ment" as saying that "'[t]he (Hansen) provision ... not only 
doesn't cod if~- existing lmY,. but it overrules existing law'"; stated 
that Hansen had "[ignored the Court of Appeals' decision in this 
case] that holds that labor can raise campaign cash only through 
voluntary funds that are 'separate and distinct ' from the sponsor-
ing union"; asserted that under the Hansen amendment "union 
chiefs ... wouldn't be required to tell members for what purpose 
the money [solicited] is going"; and quoted an Associate Deputy 
Attorney General as reporting the Government's posit ion to be" 'that 
a contribution to a political fund [must] be not only "voluntary," 
in the sense of an absence of force, but also knowingly made.''' 
40 At this point Representative Hays, a strong supporter of the 
Hansen amendment, interjected, ibid.: 
"I will say to the gentleman that what he is saying will be the 
legitimate legislati,·e history and that what somebody down in 
the Department of Justice, some Assistant Attorney General's opin-
ion [see n. 39, supra], is worth exactly as much as the piece of 
paper it is printed on, no more and no less." 
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'were assessed by the union as part of its dues struc-
ture'] ... ," since his amendment prohibited financing 
political funds through monies required for employment 
or union membership. His amendment, therefore, would 
not have the effect of "thwarting" that prosecution. 
Id., at H 94-H 95. Hansen stated, too, that his "amend--
ment is also consistent with the provisions of the so-
called Crane amendment dealing with the legality of 
a separate, voluntary political fund." Id., at H 94. 
The only difference he appears to have seen between 
his amendment and the text of the Crane provision 
quoted above was that the one made explicit what the -
other treated implicitly. Hansen explained : 
"[A]s Senator Dominick stated, speaking in sup-
port of an amendment to section 610 he offered 
to the other body, the general view is that: 
" 'If a member wishes to pay money voluntarily 
to a candidate or to a labor organization fund for 
a candidate or even to a fund which the union will 
determine how it is to be spent, I have no objec-
tions.' " 117 Cong. Rec., S. [ 13153] August 4, 1971.41 
"The Hansen amendment building on this con-
sensus tracks this language with a single addition 
making explicit what is implicit in the Crane 
amendment-that unions and corporations may 
solicit contributions to these funds as long as they 
do so without attempting to secure money through 
'physical force, job discrimination, financial repri-
sals' or the threat thereof. Thus the Hansen amend- l I 
ment does not break new ground, it merely writes 
currently accepted practices into clear and explicit 
statutory language." Id., at H 95. 
Crane made no reply to these assertions. 
41 See also 117 Cong. R ec. H 11478 (Hansen quoting approvingly 
same statement by Senator Dominick). 
40 
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"\V ~ conclude from this legislative history that the I 
term "separate" in the Hansen amendment is synony- · 
1~s with "segreg_ated." Nothing in the legisla.tive 
history indicates that the word is to be understood in 
any other way. To the contrary, Hansen's comments 
in general explanation of his amendment support that 
interpretation, as does the use of the term in the Crane 
provision, with which, Hansen said, his amendment was 
collsistent. Moreover, Hansen did not deny that his 
amendment departed from the Court of Appeals insist-
ence in the Pipefitters decision that a permissible political 
fund be separate and distinct from the sponsoring union; 
instead, he merely found his amendment consistent with 
the Government 's argument before this Court that politi-
cal contributions and expenditures cannot be made from 
dues or assessments. Finally, both the Crane and Han-
sen amendments expressly authorize unions to establish 
and administer voluntary political funds. The Hansen 
amendment also expressly authorizes union officials to 
solicit contributions and, as the quoted statement of 
Senator Dominick indicates, also permits them to deter-
mine the disposition of the monies raised. In these cir-
cumstances it is difficult to conceive how a va.lid political 
fund can be "separate" from the sponsoring union in any 
,my other than "segregated." 
Similarly, we conclude that the term "threat" and the 
phrase "dues, fees, or other monies required as a condi-
tion of membership in a labor organization or as a 
condition of employment" must be read7 )roadly to en-
compass solicitation schemes that do not make )lain the 
po 1 ica na ure o t e urnon fund an t e freedom of 
tfie ind1v1dual sohc1ted to refuse to contribute ,Yithout 
reprisal. The term and the phrase , in other ,rnrds, in-
cl2.:_de ~)pa:r.e:nt.3s w~ s act~a t 'eats and dues or 
assessments respectively. Again, Hansen's explanatory 
statements are all consistent with that interpretation. 
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mental reaction" of a union member approached by a 
union official seems better taken simply as justification 
for allowing solicitation by union officials at all rather 
than as condoning the use of tacit force or pressure. 
Moreover, if the Hansen amendment is to be construed, 
as Hansen indicated it should be, in pari materia with 
the Crane provision, it, too, must require that donations 
be made "freely and voluntarily." Likewise, if the 
amendment is meant, as Hansen said it was, to embrace 
the Government's position in this case, we merely imple-
ment his purpose by interpreting "dues, fees , or other 
monies required as a condition of membership in a labor 
organization or as a condition of employment" as in-
cluding not only actual but effective dues or assessments. 
Construed as we have done, ~ 05 of the Federal Elec-
t i,Qn Campaig_n.AcL does nothing more..than accomplish 
the_~wessed pur_posc..-oL its-author-mat- is, codify_ and 
clacify_:::.prior law. But since w·e have arrived at our 
interpretation without reference to prior law, § 205 once 
again throws on § 610 as embodied in § 304 of the Labor 
Management Relations Act " 'a cross light' " that con-
firms our understanding of the law applicable to this 
prosecution. 
Third. There is, hmYever, 01w change effected by \ L\ -- - ~~--...... ~---- ~ § 205 material to this ca~e, and that is with regard to 
the use of g(ll)eral union-mOJ1ie.s'tlo_r the es.tablishrn .. e.nt,  
admiu'!stration. an~itation 0~ 011-tcib._ution.s.. for 
political funds. Section 304 of the Labor Management 
Relations Act plainly prohibited such use. The Hansen 
amendment eqvally plrrinl):...permi.ifzit. 
As we have seen. ante, p. 17, PAC was initially fi-
nanced from general union treasuries. After the nomi-
nation of President Roosevelt for re-election , however, 
the costs of administration of PAC as well as its political 
expenditures were mainly, although not entirely, financed 
from a segregated account of voluntary individual dona-
tions. The House campaign expenditures committee 
42 
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explained in its 1945 report, H. R. Rep. Ko. 2093, supra, 
at 5: 
"[I]t is not .. . possible completely to separate 
the resources and facilities made available to the 
Political Action Committee even after July 23, 1944 
[ when Roosevelt was nominated for re-election], 
from those of the Congress of Industrial Organiza-
tions and its unions. On the national level and in 
most States that separation appears to have been 
preserved so far as cash income and cash expendi-
tures for strictly Political Action Committee, as dis-
tinguished from union activities are concerned. The 
local distribution of Political Action literature, for 
example, has been largely handled by volunteers 
on their own time; and the contributions have 
largely been taken by shop stewards outside work-
ing hours. But no such separation has proved pos-
sible where the use of union offices "2 and office 
personnel is concerned. Union personnel assigned 
to full-time Political Action Committee work have 
typically been transferred from the union to the 
Political Action Committee pay roll . But the part 
time Political Action Committee services of persons 
who are both union and Political Action Committee 
officers cannot be thus readily segregated." 
In endorsing PAC in the enactment of § 304 of the 
Labor Management Relations Act, Congress clearly not 
only had in mind PAC's financial structure after July 
42 Compare Senate Hearing, sup ra 11. 33, at 41 (regional PAC 
offices, to Sidney Hillman's knowledge, separate from CIO offices, as 
"we don' t like them to mL, their union business with political 
acfo·ities"), and House Hearings, supra, 11. 31, at 901 (testimony of 
regional PAC director) (regional office financed from national PAC 
headquarters), with House Hearings, id., at 717-718, 736, 841, 
857-861, 867-868, 872 ( overlapping use of offices on state and local 
level) . 
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1944, but assumed that its activities in the future, in-
cluding the costs of administration and solicitation of 
contributions as ,vell as its political expenditures, ·would 
be strictly paid for by voluntary donations separate from 
union dues and assessments. It assumed as ,rnll that 
even the expenses of organization of new union political 
funds ,rnuld be similarly financed. See, e. g., S. Rep. 
No. 101, supra, at 24 (statement by Senators Ball and 
Ferguson, quoted ante, p. 18) ; 93 Cong Rec. 6439, 6440 
(remarks by Senator Taft, quoted ante, pp. 20- 21). 
In contrast, the Hansen amendment provides that '.1,L 
shall be unlawful for such a fund to make a contribu-
tion or expenditure by utihzrn money or an t · of 
value secure " in a pro 1 1 ';;,d way. onceivably this 
language could be read, consistently with § 304, to forbid 
making contributions or expenditures through the estab-
lishment or administration of a political fund or through 
the solicitation of donations financed by general union 
monies. But that is neither the plain meaning nor, as 
the legislative history of § 205 shows, the intended con-
struction of the provision. When the Hansen amend-
ment was first introduced, its sponsor explained: 
"As a further safeguard [against the use of a 
compulsory fund for political purposes] the proviso 
makes it a violation for such a fund to make a 
contribution or expenditure from money collected 
as dues or other fees required as a condition of 
membership or employment or obtained through 
commercial transactions. This insures that any 
money, service, or tangible item-such as a type-
writer, Xerox machine, and so forth-provided to 
a candidate by such a fund must be financed by 
the voluntary political donations it has collected." 
117 Cong. Rec. H 11478- H 11479. 
At no point in the debate on § 205 did Hansen suggest 
that his amendment was to be read more broadly than 
44 
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this, despite the fact that the Wall Street Journal article 
inserted in the record by Representative Crane specifi-
cally charged that "union chiefs could use dues money 
to pay for the soliciting .... " 118 id., at H 88. Fur-
thermore, the exemption for the e~ablishment, admin-1 
istration, and solicitation of contributions for voluntary 
political funds was but one 61 three exceptions to ihe 
general rule against corporations and labor organizations 
making contributions or expenditures in connection with 
federal elections. The other t,rn exceptions were com-
munications to, and nonpartisan registration and get-out-
the-vote campaigns aimed at, stockholders or union 
members and their families. In explaining the three 
exemptions, Hansen clearly regarded each of them a§ a 
permissible activity to be financed by general union 
funds, for each, m his vie"·, ,Yas an activity "·here group 
inter'"ests predominated -rn and "the interest of the minor-
ity [was] weakest." 117 id., at H 11478. 
"At the present time [Hansen summarized] there 
is broad agreement as to the essence of the proper 
balance in regulating corporate and union political 
4
" l'i' ith the exemption for communications to stockholders or 
union members and their families apparent]>· in mind, Hansen 
stated, for ex:1mple1 117 icl .. at H 11478: 
" [El Yery organization should be allowed to take the steps necessary 
for its growth and Fun·i,·al. There is, of course, no need to belabor 
the point that Go,·rrnmrnt policies profound!~• affect both business 
and labor. . . . If an org:rnization, whethrr it be the NA'\l, the 
A'\IA or the AFL-CIO, believes that certain candidate~ po,e a 
threat to its well-being or the well-being of its member;:; or stock-
holders, it should be able io get it s views to those member;; or 
stockholder:; . As fiduciari es for their member:; and stockholders 
the offi cers of the~e in,-titut ions h:ff e a dut>· to share t heir informed 
insights on all issues affecting their institu t ion with their constitu-
ents. Bot h union members and stockholdrrs ha,·e the right to 
expect this expert guidance." 
This reasoning, of course, applies as well to solicita tions for contribu-
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activity required by sound policy and the Constitu-
tion. It consists of a strong prohibition on the use 
of corporate and union treasury funds to reach the 
general public in support of, or opposition to, Fed-
eral candidates and a,.Jirnited permission to wr-
po.!!tions and unions, allowing them to communi-
ca~e freely with members and stockhol®rs on any 
subject. to attem t to convince members and stoc ·-
holders to register and vote, an to ma e political 
co!1tribut10ns and expen'a'itur~ financed by volun-
tary donat10ns ,duch have been kept in a separa 
segregate un . 1s amen ment wntes t mt bal-
a11'clfinto' ciear and unequivocal statutory language." 
Id. , at H 11479. 
Thus, ~ 205 has in one respect impliedly repealed the 
substantive law relating to this prosecution:' 4 We turn 
now to address the significance of this change. 
II 
The rule is well established that prosecutions under 
statutes impliedly or expressly repealed while the case 
is still pending on direct revie,Y must abate in the ab-
sence of a demonstration of contrary congressional in-
tent or a general saving statute. For, "[p]rosecution 
for crimes is but an application or enforcement of the 
la,Y, and if the prosecution continues the law must con-
tinue to vivify it. " United States v. Chambers, 291 U. S. 
205, 226 (1934) . This doctrine had its earliest expres-
sion in United States v. Schooner Peggy, l Cranch 103· 
( 1801) , and has since "been consistently recognized and 
41 See, e. g., United States Y . Tynen , 11 1Yal l. 88, 92 (1871): 
"[Ilt is a familiar doctrine ihat repeals by implication a re not 
favored. When there arc t\\·o acts on the same subj ect the rule is 
to girn effect to both if pos~iblc. But if the two are repugnant in 
any of their proYisions. the latter act, without any repealing clause, 
operates to the extent of the rcpugnancy as a repea l of the-
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applied by this Court." Bell v. Maryland, 378 U. S. 
226, 231 n. 2 (1964) . As Chief Justice Hughes observed 
in Chambers, supra, "The principle involved is . .. not 
archaic but rather is continuing and vital,-that the 
people are free to withdraw the authority they have 
conferred and, when withdrawn, . .. courts [cannot] 
assume the right to continue to exercise it." 
In this case, however, although we do not find a 
demonstration of contrary congressional intent sufficient 
to overcome application of this rule,4" ,ve do hold that 
the general federal saving statute, 61 Stat. 635, 1 U. S. C. 
§ 109, operates to nullify abatement of the prosecution. 
That statute provides in pertinent part: 
"The repeal of any statute shall not have the 
effect to release or extinguish any penalty, forfeiture, 
45 The Government's supplemental brief in response to the ques-
tions posed in n. 11 , supra, argues that "[h]ere there is no problem 
of inferring legislatirn intent because Congress [in t he House de-
bates l clearly expressed its intention that pending prosecutions 
should not abate." Supplemental Brief for the United States, at 
7. Representative Hansen, to be sure, did state in the debate 
that this prosecution would not abat e. See p. 38, ante. But 
he also indicated that the effect of his amendment on pending 
cases was not, and should not be, a matter of concern: 
"Obviously, the members of the joint Senate-House conference 
committee were not concerned about the suggested effect of this 
amendment on pending cases. Kor were Members of the other 
body who approved the conference report by voice vote. There 
is no reason for Members of this body to be concerned . This is 
much needed and meritorious legislation. I strongly urge an over-
whelming vote of approval." 118 Cong. Rec. H 95. 
l\Iore important, Hansen 's view that this prosecution would con-
tinue was premised, as we have seen, on a mistaken understanding 
of what § 610 previously provided in terms applicable to this case. 
In that circumstance we would have to assume that Congress would 
intend the general rule of abatement "applicable as part of the 
background against which [it] acts," Hamm v. Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 
306, 314 (1964), to prevail. 
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or liability incurred under such statute, unless the 
repealing Act shall so expressly provide, and such 
statute shall be treated as still remaining in force 
for the purpose of sustaining any proper action or 
prosecution for the enforcement of such penalty, 
forfeiture, or liability." 
In United States v. R eisinger, 128 U. S. 398 (1888) , the 
Court reviewed an indictment, returned in 1885, alleg-
ing that the defendant, an attorney, had in 1883 charged 
clients in pension cases against the Government $100 
and $50 respectively in violation of a $10 maximum fee 
established by Act of Congress, June 20, 1878, 20 Stat. 
243. Despite the fact that Congress had expressly re-
pealed that Act and raised the maximum permissible fee 
in pension cases to $25 in 1884, Act of Congress, July 4, 
1884, 23 Stat. 98, the Court sustained the indictment 
on the basis of the federal saving statute. In Hamm v. 
Rock Hill, 379 U. S. 306 (1964), on the other hand, we 
held that the saving statute would not nullify abate-
ment of federal prosecutions for trespass in public res-
taurants following enactment of the public accommo~ a-
tion requirements of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. We 
explained, id., at 314: 
"The federal saving statute was originally enacted in 
1871, 16 Stat. 432. It was meant to obviate mere · 
technical abatement such as that illustrated by the 
application of the rule in [ United States v. Tynen, 
11 Wall. 88,] decided in 1871. There a substitution 
of a new statute with a greater schedule of penalties 
·was held to abate the previous prosecution. In con-
trast, the Civil Rights Act works no such technical 
abatement. It substitutes a right for a crime. So 
drastic a change is well beyond the narrow language 
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if the convictions ,yere under a federal statute they 
would be abated." 
The instant case is controlled by Reisinger rather than 
by Hamm. ~ection 205 of the Federal Election Cam- r { 
paign Act does, of course, make lawful what was pre_vi-
ousl:;,: unlawful-namely, the financing oft he establish-
ment, administratiQ..!1 and sohc1tat1on of contnbut1011s fpr 
volm~tary political funds from_general union_ rnonies. 
But § 205 does not "substitute a right for a crime." To 
the contrary, as in Reisinger and Tynen, it retains the 
basic offense-contributions or expenditures by labor 
organizations in connection v,ith federal elections are still 
forbidden so long as they are paid for from actual or 
effective dues or assessments. V\"e thc~efor.e hold- t:h~t 
etitiQ:OeI's remain punislrabJc to -~ f tLll_exte1it _!lnder 
§ 610 asj Jcgov~ed w1i~ tic.aLfunds. . .beiore i_ts r~~·nt 
anie11dment. ,v e turnoow to determine whether the 
co1wicticms belmY have been returned consistently with 
that law. 
III 
The Government urges: 
"The essential charge of the indictment and the 
theory on which the case ,ms tried ,ms that the 
[Pipefitters] Fund, although formally set up as an 
entity independent of Local 562, was in fact a union 
fund, controlled by the union, contributions to which -,Yere assessed by the union as part of its dues struc-
ture, collected from non-members in lieu of dues, and 
expended, when deemed necessary, for union pur-
poses and the personal use of the directors of the 
Fund." Brief for the United States, at 23 ( emphasis 
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added). See also Brief for the United States in 
Opposition to the Petition for Certiorari, at 11-12.◄ c 
This was indeed, as we shall shortly see, the theory on 
which the indictment was drawn, the jury, instructed, 
and petitioners' convictions, affirmed. It_is also the 
co1clruct1011 ol §. 610 that w~e rejectea in favor., qf 
the. Governmcnt's narrower construction tl1at,._the pre-
requisite for a permissible-political fund-:is~sim1)lJ'., that · 
11Q.t he finaT1cec.Lb~ tual or cffectfre duc-s or asscssme11ts. 
Ante, pp. 26- 28. On the other hand , we find that the in-
dictment may be read to allege not only that the Pipe-
fitters fund was "a union fund , controlled by the union," 
but that "contributions to it were assessed by the union 
as part of its dues structure, [and] were collected from 
non-members in lieu of dues . ... " We also find that 
the indictment may be read to allege that the establish-
ment, administration , and solicitation of contributions 
for the fund were financed from general union monies, 
which ,rn have held was unlawful before the recent 
Hansen amendment, ante, pp. 41- 43, and, though no 
longer prohibited, remains punishable if committed be-
for that amendment. Ante, pp. 47-48. Nevertheless, 
for reasons that follon·, we (()o-::n_Qt---now c011strne the 
indictment as making either o:Hi1 cs_e esse11tial allegations, 
but leave that question open for determination on re-
mand. ·w &-h_old 110w only_that the j11ry--i11structim1s -- ..,._, 
"
0 The GoYernment 's supplemental brief in retiponse to the ques-
tions posed in n. 11, supra, confirms that this was the the01·~· of the 
pro:;ecution: 
"In short, the case was tried on the theory that the fund here 
i11Yolrnd was not the kind of a fund which the amended statute 
permi ts but was the kind of a fund \Yhich was and still is a Yioln.-
tion of Section 610-a fund which, while otit cnsibly separate, was 
in fac t a union fund, supported by money collected as union money 
and used, when deemed desirable, as general union funds." Supple-
mental Brief for the Unit.eel States, at 5 (emphasis in original) 
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Petitioners moved before trial to dismiss the in-
dictment on the ground, Appendix to Petitioners' Brief, 
at 28: 
"The gist of the indictment is to allege that Sec-
tion 610 .. . prohibits labor unions from forming 
parallel political organizations ·which receive volun-
tary contributions from the members of the union 
to be contributed and expended in Federal elections. 
Congress intended such political organizations to be 
legally authorized . Thus, the indictment fails to 
state an offense . ... " 
Petitioners also moved for a bill of particulars, id., at 30: 
"whether it is the government's position and theory 
of the case that the mere fact that the [Pipefi.tters 
fund] was established, maintained, and administered 
by members, officers, employees, agents, foremen and 
shop stewards of Local 562 is, in and of itself, suf-
ficient to make said :Fund, under the law, a Fund of 
Local 562; . . . whether or not it is the government's 
position that Section 610 ... prohibits the members, 
officers, employees, agents, and foremen and shop 
stewarts [sic] of a union from establishing any po-
litical organization or fund for the purpose of making 
contributions and expenditures in connection with 
[federal] elections . . . ; . . . whether it is the 
government 's position and theory of the case that 
the alleged 'regular and systematic collection, re-
ceipt, and expenditures of money obtained from 
,vorking members of Local 562 and from working 
members of other labor organizations employed 
under jurisdiction of the defendant Local 562' 
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were voluntary or involuntary collections and 
contributions." 47 
In a memorandum in opposition to the motion to dis-
miss, the Government acknowledged petitioners' argu-
ment "that the indictment is defective in that it does 
not allege that the funds involved were not voluntary"· 
and took the position that "[p] roof of the offense charged 
here does not depend upon whether the funds were 
volunteered or not by union members. The issue is 
whether these funds were the general funds of Local 562," 
id., at 57, which the indictment, in the Government's 
view, charged by implication in alleging that petitioners 
" 'unlawfully, wilfully and knowingly did conspire and 
agree with each other ... to violate Section 610 .... ' " 
Id., at 54. The trial court overruled each of petitioners'· 
motions without opinion. 
On appeal the Court of Appeals adopted the Govern- f 
ment's theory of the case. First, it ruled that by impli-
cation " [ t] he gist of the government's claim as refieQJ;ed I 
2' the indictment~ that the money m the fund is jn 
trutlf and in fact money belongrng to Local 56J." 434 
F'.2d, at 1'1"2u.48 The court then held, ibid.: 
47 These inquiries were addressed io paragraphs 7, 10, and 17 of 
the indictment, see n. 2, supra. Identical or comparable inquiries 
were generally leveled at other pertinent paragraphs of t he 
indictment. 
48 The court arrived at this conclusion on the basis of United 
States v. L ewis Food Co., supra, n. 29, where the Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit sustained an indictment under § 610 that 
fai led to allege expressly that an expenditu re by a corporation in: 
connection with a federal election was financed from the general 
corporate treasury (or, as discussed in n. 29, supra, that it was 
made against the wishes of an individual stockholder). 
"In our opinion [the court there explained], the allegation in the 
indictment that the corporation made an 'expenditure' for the stated 
purpose, necessarily infers [sic] an allegation that general corporate 
funds were used. Corporate expenditures normally come from a 
52 
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"The failure of the indictment to allege that the / 
payments to the fund ,rnre involuntary is not 
fatal . . . . If [ the allegation that the money in \ 
the fund is in fact Union money] is established by 
the evidence, the issue of whether the payment to the 
fund is voluntary or involuntary is not controlling. 
"Of course as observed by the [ trial] court in its 
instructions, the issue of ,vhether the payments to 
the fund ,vere voluntary is relevant and material on 
the issue of whether the fund is the property of 
Local 562. Other considerations such as the inten-
tion of the donors as to o,vnership and control of the 
fund also bear upon the issue." 
This account of the proceedings below indicates that 
the question of the voluntari ness of the cont,~ibutions 
to the Pipefitters fund ,rnC ~garded both- at- tri = d 
on appeal as a rnaitcr;:fclatrng o, 'ut- not c.ss_c.iitial;fp 
the basic. cJu1rge of tbe~indictment- t11aLLo -52 con-
ceale politica con n ut10ns of Union monies through 
the subterfuge of a Union-controlled fund. This theory, 
of course, flies in the face of the legislative history of 
§ 610. Aside from the question of using general union 
monies to finance the establishment, administration, or-






in~pre~sive !ess_on of t~1at history is ~hat tJrn::poJi.ti?al con-
tribubcms rn 1~sue~ v10laicd ~ 610-rf;-m1d 011ly- 1f:-~-
ments to the fund were actually or"" effectiYcly re mrcg 
for ernp oyment or union mem ership. In other words, 
t~sence of the crime in this respect is whether the 
method of solicitation for the fund was calculated to 
result in knowing free-choice donations. Whether the-
fund ,ms otherwise controlled by the Union is 
immaterial. 
corporation's general fund~ :1ncl not from some inde1wnclr11t fund 
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,Yu!J iuk,_u_evertheless;thai- the~ dictment may be );.,v_ ~ ~ 
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read, consistently ,vith the proper interpretation of ~,y ~ 
§ 610, tQ allege. that the contributions to the Pipefitters (0 ~ _ ~ 
f ll.!ld- de1:i~ from cffec:.tiye__du.e.s~or asscssmelltS.49 We ~·co/ 
also think that t_he indictment r~ay be read , despite ~he ~ ~ 4-
Government's failure to make this argument, as chargrng ~~- -~ 1 
that the establishment, administration, and solicitation ~~· ~ ~ 
of contributions for the fund were financed from the ~ 
general union treasury. See paragraphs 7, 15, and 16 of { @  _- _ }.__ 
q., ~
49 The hmrt of the indictment is found in p:1ragraph 10, which 
~t:1t es, n. 2. supra: 
"It w:1s a part of s:1id conspirae~- th:it the defendants . . "·ould 
cst:iblish and maintain :1 specia l fund .. . , which fund \\'Ould ham 
the appe;1rance of being a "·holly independent entit.v, separate and 
;1p:1rt from LocaJ 562 ; nnd th:1t the defendants . . . would thereby 
conceal the fact that Loc;1l 562 would make contributions and 
expenditures in connection 1Yith [fcdcr;1l] elections . . .. " 
As in L ewis Food Co., supra. n. 48, it is a fair inference from this 
nllrg:1tion tlrnt the union made prohibited politic:11 contributions 
;1nd expenditures from general union monies rnther than from the 
kno1Yini:r free-choice donnt ions of iudi\'idual members. 1\foreover , 
the indictment not on]~- express!~- allei:res that collections for the 
fund "·ere " rei:rul:ir :rnd systrmatic" :it an established rate, see 
p;1rngr;1phs 7, 13, 15, and 16 of the indictment , 11 . 2. supra, but 
specifically charges in p:1rngr:1ph 14, ibid. (emph:isis nclded): 
"It ,vas further a pa rt of the con~pirncY tlrnt the defendnnts .. 
would wnive and foil to enforce Sect ion 180 of the Constitution 
of the United Association in order to facilitnte the payment of 
monies into the Fund . by failing to collect from non-members of 
Local 562. \\'Orking undr r its jmisdiction , a required travel card 
f<'e of not in excess of Eight Doll:irs (/;8.00) per month . and in lieu 
thereof. collecting payments to the Fund at the rate of Two Dollars 
(82.00) per eight-hoi1r working day from such non-members." 
These nllcgation, together. although not n model of clarit~,, might 
(but we do not now dccidr for thr re:i~ons stated in the text) const i-
tutr "a pl:iin , conci~e, :111d definite" statement, wi thin the me:ining 
of Rule 7 ( c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. that 
the conspirncy included the :ictnn l or effecti\·e assessment of con-
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the indictment, n. 2, supra. But whether the indictment ( 
should now be construed in light of the proceedings 
belo"· to make either of these allegations is an alto-
gether different question. 50 Since this precise question 
was not addressed below and has not been briefed or 
argued before us and since the case must, in any event; 
be remanded, whereupon the issue may become moot,51 
vve do not no"· undertake to decide it. Instead, in 
the event that the Government chooses to proceed 
with the indictment before us, petitioners shall have 
leave to renew their moti 1 to dismiss. 
econ . The jur instructions embody an inter :ireta-
tion of § 610 that is plainl.Y~e~eous. The trial court 
refused requests by petitioners for instructions that the 
jury should acquit if it found that contributions to the 
Pipefitters fund were made voluntarily. 02 Adopting a ----
5° Compare, e. g., Hagner v. United States, 285 U. S. 427 (1932); 
United States Y. Comyns, 248 U. S. 349 (1919), and Dunlop v. 
United States, 16 U. S. 486 (1897) , with, e. g., United States v. 
Boston & M. R. Co., 380 U. S. 157, 159 n. 1 (1965), and Russell 
"· United States, 369 U. S. 749 (1962). 
51 Although two of the petitioners died pending decisjon in this 
case, see n. 12, supra, the Government may decide on remand to 
seek a new indictment against the remaining petitioners. The 
present indictment charges that the conspiracy continued up to 
the date of the indictment, l\lay 9, 1968, and that an overt act 
was committed in furtherance of the conspiracy on July 14, 1967, 
in which case it does not appear that the five-year statute of 
limitations governing conspiracy offenses has run. See 18 U. S. C. 
§ 3282; Grunewald v. United States, 353 U. S. 391, 396-397 (1957). 
See also United States v. R eisinger, supra (indictment v;1lid , though / 
returned after law impliedly repealed.) 
52 Petitioners offered seven instructions on '\·oluntariness." Two 
merely used the term without further definition, while others re-
ferred to whether the contributions constituted union dues or 
assessments or were made by the donors for political purposes. 
Sec Appendix to Petitioners' Brief, at 1096-1100. Hereafter proper 
inst ructions on the question of voluntariness may be framed in 
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contrary view, the court instructed the jury, over peti-
tioners' objections, that it should return verdicts of 
guilty if the fund "was in fact a union fund , ... the 
money therein was union money, and . . . the real con-
tributor to the candidates was the union." "In deter-
mining whether the Pipefitters Voluntary Fund was a 
bona fide fund, separate and distinct from the union or a 
mere artifice or device," the jury was further instructed 
to "take into consideration all the facts and circum-
stances in evidence, and in such consideration . . . [to] 
consider" 19 factors, several of which related to the 
regularity, rate, method of collection, and segregation 
from Union monies of payments to the fund. Others 
concerned the kinds of expenditures the fund made and 
the Union's control over them. Still others involved 
whether the payments to the fund were made volun-
tarily. In the latter regard the court charged ( emphasis 
added): 
"A great deal of evidence has been introduced 
on the question whether the payments into the 
Pipefitters Voluntary ... Fund by members of 
Local 562 and others working under its jurisdiction 
were voluntary or involuntary. This evidence is 
relevant for your consideration, along with all other 
facts and circumstances in evidence, in determining 
whether the fund is a union fund. However, the 
mere fact that the payments into the fund may have 
been ?Jiade voluntarily by some or even all of the 
contributors thereto does not, of itself, mean that 
the money so paid into the fund was not union 
money." See n. 9, supra. 
terms of the application to the proofs of the language of § 205 of 
the Federal Election Campaign Act as herein construed. Ante, . 
pp. 34-41. 
.. 
-. "\~, .. 
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On appeal the Court of Appeals did not address the· 
validity of these instructions other than to agree with 
the trial judge that "the issue of whether the payments 
to the fund were voluntary is relevant and material 
[but not determinative] on the issue of whether the 
fund is the property of Local 562." Ante, p. 51. 
The instructions, as the Court of Appeals confirmed, 
clearly permitted the jury to convict without finding 
either that donations to the Pipefitters fund had been 
actual or effective dues or assessments or that general 
union monies had been used in the fund's establishment 
or administration or in the solicitation of contributions. 
This was plain error. 53 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals as to petitioners 
Callanan and Lawler is vacated, and the case is remanded 
to the District Court with directions to dismiss the in-
dictment against them. See n. 12, supra. The judg-
ment of the Court of Appeals as to petitioners Local 562 
and Lawler is reversed, and the case is remanded to the 
District Court for proe:eedings as to them not incon-. 
sistent with this opinion_. 
It is so ordered. 
MR. JusTICE BLACKMUN took no part in the con,-
sideration or decision of .this case. 
5 3 The Court of Appeals did not directly rule on the validity . of 
the instruct ions because, in the majority's view, petitioners had 
failed to prcsern their objections on appeal. See 434 F. 2d, at 
1125. Sec nlso id ., at 1128 (Matthes, C. J ., concurring). The 
dissen t bclo\\· makes a strong argU:ment to the contrary, see id ., at 
1135 (Lay, J.) , but we need not address the question, since the 
instructions wei'e plainly erroneo11s, and we may notice a plain 
error not presented. See, e. g., Silber v. United States, 370 U. S. 
711 (1962); Scretvs v. United States, 325 U. S. 91, 107 (1945). 
See also 434 F. 2d, at 1130 (Heaney, J. , dissenting), 1135 (Lay, J., 
dissenting). 
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Mr. Justice Brennan 













NOTE: Where It Is deemed desirable, a syllabus (headnote) will 
be released, Ill! Is being clone In connection with thi s case, at the time Mr• 









ot the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decis ions for 
the convenience of the reader. See U11ited State• v. D etro-It Lumbrr Brennan J 
Oo., 200 U.S. 321, 337. J!TOID: • • 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED ST.Afrffl1at ed: _ __ _ 
- -,-..I' 
Recirculated: ~ -, .) -
Syllabus 
PIPEFITTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 562 ET AL. V. 
UNITED ST ATES 
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 
THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT 
No. 70-74. Argued Jamrnry 11 , 1972-Decided April - , 1972 
Petitioner union and three of its officers were com·irted of con-
spiracy to violate 18 U . S. C. § 610, which prohibited a labor 
orgnnization from ru n.king a cont ribution or :rn expenditure in 
connection with a. fcdernl election . Evidence indicated that the 
union from 1949 through 1962 maintained a political fund to 
which union members and others working under the umon's juris-
diction were required to contribute and tha.t that fund was then 
s~ceecled by !.h,e presenLf.uncl , which w~ , in form , set up as a 
separate "yo]untar_v" organization ; union officials, n~ , 
r~ the fund , and no significnnt chnnge 
w~e in .he regular and systematic collec~ns 
at a prescn ed rate ase on ours wor ·e ; umon agents, more-
o,~ do~bsitescini"mion fime, ana 
~s were used for a variety of j)lirpcises,111cluding polit icaI 
contributions in connection with federal elections; those contri--
butions, on the other hand , \Ycre made from accounts strictly 
segregated from union clues and assessments, and although some I 
of the contributors belicYed otherwise, donations to the fund 
were not, in fact , nccessa r)' for employment or union membership. 
Under instructions to determine whether the monies spent for-
polit ical contributions by the fund were in reality contributors', 
or union, monies, the jury found each clefcnclant guilty . The 
Court of Appea ls rejected petit10ners' challenges , an held that 
the fund was a ~) t hrough which the union made po-
litical contributions of union monies in Yiolat ion of § 610. The 
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 , which became effective-
after oral a rgument here, added a paragraph at the end of § 610 
which expressly authorizes labor organizations to establish, ad-
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that the fund not make a contribution or expenditure in connec-
tion with a federal election by utilizing money or anything of 
value secured by physical force, job discrimination, financial re-
prisals, or the threat thereof, or by monies required as a condition 
of employment or union membership. Held: 
1. Section 610, as confirmed by the Federal Election Campaign 
Act, does not apply to contributions or expenditures from union 
political funds financed by emplo:vecs of their own free and know-.. __..,,,_., ____ _ 
ing choice. Pp. 15-26. 
2.Again as confirmed by the Federal Election Campaign Act, 
a legitimate political fund mu~t be separate from the sponsoring 
union only in the sense that there must be a strict segregation of 
its monies from union dues and assessments, and ~ icitation by 
union officials, a~sible, m~ ir-
cumstances lainly indicatincr that donntions are for a political 
purpose and that those solicited may dee ine to contribute without 
reprisal. Pp. 26-41. 
3. Section 610 may be interpreted to prohibited the use of 
genera.I union monies for the establishment, administration, or 
solicitation of contributions for union political funds. By clearly 
permitting such use, the Federnl Election Campnign Act may, 
therefore, have implied]~, repealed § 610. Pp. 41-45. 
4. Even of there hns been such an implied repeal, it, neverthe-
less, does not reqnire abatement of the prosecution against peti-
tioners because of the federal saving sta tute, 1 U. S. C. § 109. 
United States v. R eisinger, 128 U. S. 398, followed. Hamm v. 
Rock Hill, 379 U. S. 306, distinguished. Pp. 45-48. 
5. The instructions to the ju wer clearl rron ous because 
they permitted the jury to convict without finding that donations 
to the fund were actual or effecfo·e dues or nssessments. The 
sufficiency of the indictment is left open for determination on re-
mand. Pp. 48-56. 
434 F. 2d 1127, vacated and remanded to the District Court with 
instructions to dismiss indictment against petitioners Callanan and 
Lawler, both now deceased, and reversed and remanded to the 
District Court as to remaining petitioners. 
~? 
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.. To : The Chie~ Justice Mr. J us tice Douglas 
Mr. J usti ce Br ennan 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
Mr. Justice \Vhi te 
Mr. J ustice !farshall 
Mr. Justice Blackmu;': 
Mr . Justice Rehnquist 
1st DRAFT 
From: Powell, J . 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STA~§culated: 
No. 70-74 Recircula teJt/N 2 0 1972 
Pipefitters Local Union No.) On ·writ of Certiorari to 
562 et al. , Petitioners, the United States Court 
v. of Appeals for the Eighth 
United States. Circuit. 
[June 22, 1972] , . 
·r: 11/H w.T-/fl C?lnir C/,.,7t(J iv"-
MR. JusTICE PowELLl dissenting. '-A/I I 11'" " .- ~ ' 
The decision of the C;;;,t today will have a profound 
effect upon the role of labor unions and corporations in 
the political life of this country. The holding, reversing 
a trend since 1907, opens the way for major participation 
in politics by the largest aggregations of economic power, 
the great unions and corporations. This occurs at a time, 
paradoxically, when public and legislative interest has 
focused on limiting-rather than enlarging-the influ-
ence upon the elective process of concentrations of wealth 
and power. 
I 
The majority opinion holds that unions lawfully may 
make political contributions so long as they come from 
funds voluntarily given to the union for such purpose. 
The Court seeks to buttress this by holding by a long 
and scholarly presentation of the legislative history of 
§ 610 of the Labor Management Relations Act. But 
5ome of that history invites conflicting inferences, and 
the background of § 205 of the Federal Election Cam-
paign Act of 1971, to which the majority also devotes ex-
2 
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tensive attention, is of dubious value in interpreting an 
earlier statute which on its face is clear and unambiguous.1 
In its preoccupation with the legislative history, the 
Court has overlooked the central point involved in this 
case: that the conviction of petitioners accords with the 
plain language of the controlling statute. Nor does the 
majority demonstrate an ambiguity in that statutory 
language that makes relevant its long journey into the 
legislative history. 
The operative language of § 610 states that: "It is 
unlawful ... for any corporation whatever, or any labor 
organization to make a contribution or expenditure in 
connection ·with" any federal election. Despite this 
unqualified proscription, the majority opinion sustains 
the right of unions and corporations to make political 
contributions directly, provided only that the funds there-
for came voluntarily from members, employees or stock-
holders and are maintained separately from the other 
funds of the union or corporation. 2 vVith all respect, 
this holding is precisely contrary to the express language 
of the law. At the risk of unnecessary repetition I 
1 The ma.iorit :v opm1on finds confirmation of its interpretation of 
the legislative history of § 610 in the recently enacted § 205 of the 
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971. The mnjority ronrludes, 
howenr, that § 205 is not ret roa rt ive and therefore is inapplicable to 
this case, a view which I share. I find it unnecessary to the dis-
position of this case to intertwine the legislative histor~, of the two· 
statutes when only one of them if' applicable. 
2 The alleged sepnrnte fund invoh·ed in this case was segregated 
on ly in the sense tlrnt there was a separnte ledger and b:mk account. 
The Court of Appea ls held that there was "subst:mtia l e\'idence to 
support a jury finding that t he fund ,ms not a bona fide separ:1 te 
and distinct entity." 434 F. 2d, at 1121. The decision of the ma-
jorit~· focuses attention on the i1<sue of rnluntariness and gives li tt le 
indicat ion that a more rea list ic segregation of the fund is requ ired. 
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set forth in juxtaposition the operative language in § 610 
as contrasted with that of the Court's holding: 
Section 310 Court's Holding 
"It is unlawful ... for ... 
and labor organization to 
make a contribution or ex-
penditure in connection 
with any (federal) elec-
tion .... " 
"Section 610 does not ap-
ply to union contributions 
and expenditures from po-
litical funds donated by 
Union members of their 
own free and knowing 
choice." 
If words are given their normal meaning, the statute 
and the Court's holding flatly contradict each other. One 
says that it shall be unlawful for a union to make a 
political contribution or expenditure. The other says 
this is perfectly lawful, so long as the funds which the 
union contributes or expends were donated freely and 
knowingly. The Court has simply added a qualification, 
not found in the statutory language, which significantly 
changes the meaning of this Act of the Congress. 
The Court's holding, moreover, directly counters the 
purposes for which § 610 was enacted. Congress passed 
this legislation to restrict and minimize the influence 
corporations and unions might exert on elections. In 
United States v. CIO, 335 U. S. 106, 113 (1948), with 
respect to corporations, the Court stated : 
"'This legislation seems to have been motivated by 
t,rn considerations. First, the necessity for destroy-
ing the influence over elections which corporations 
exercised through financial contributions. Second, 
the feeling that corporation officials had no moral 
right to use corporate funds for contributions to 
political parties without the consent of the stock-
holders.' " 
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In commenting on the reasons for extending the legisla-
tion to labor organizations, the Court in the same case 
observes: 
"Its legislative history indicates congressional be-
lief that labor unions should then be put under the 
same restraints as had been imposed upon corpora-
tions. It was felt that the influence vvhich labor 
unions exercised over elections through monetary ex-
penditures should be minimized, and that it "·as 
unfair to individual union members to permit the 
union leadership to make contributions from general 
union funds to a political party which the individual 
member might oppose." 335 U. S. 115. 
The two prinicpal motivations for the enactment of 
§ 610, as identified in C/0, are (i) the minimizing of in-
fluence of labor unions (as well as corporations) on elec-
tions "through monetary expenditures"; and (ii) the 
elimination of the unfairness "to individual union mem-
bers" of allowing union management to make political 
contributions from general union funds. It seems self-
evident that both of these legislative purposes will be 
frustrated by the Court's holding that, despite the lan-
guage of the statute forbidding union contributions, un-
ions may now make political contributions and expendi-
tures, provided only that the source of a fund is voluntary. 
To be sure, there is some langauge in the congressional 
debates which emphasizes the freedom of union members, 
as well as that of employees and stockholders of cor-
porations, to make uncoerced political contributions. No 
one contests this basic freedom. But whatever may have 
been said in congressional debates, courts are bound by 
what is written into legislation. If the language of a 
statute is clear and unambiguous there is no occasion to 
resort to legislative history. Nor can such history, how-
ever illuminating it may seem, be relied upon to contra-
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diet or dilute or add unspecified conditions to statutory 
language which is perfectly clear. Where statutory pro-
visions were "clear and unequivocal on their face," the· 
Court has found "no need to resort to the legislative his-
tory of the Act." United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643, 
648' (1961). As Justice Black observed, "no legislative 
history can justify judicial emasculation" of the unam-
biguous language of a statute. Maryland Casualty Co. v. 
Cushing, 347 U.S. 409,437 (1951) (Black, J. , dissenting).& 
II 
Accepting, as I think we must, § 610 as written , the 
issue in this case is whether the political fund of Local 
562 was in reality a sham or subterfuge through ,vhich 
the union itself made the contributions forbidden by the 
statute. The indictment in this case was framed on this 
basis, and the jury was so instructed. The question 
properly addressed by the Court of Appeals was "whether 
the contributions or expenditures were [in fact] made by 
a labor organization." 434 F. 2d 1116, 1121 (1970)~ 
After summarizing the evidence submitted to the jury 
on this issue, the Court of Appeals concluded: 
"There is substantial evidence to support a jury 
finding that the fund was not a bona fide separate 
and distinct entity but was in fact a device set up 
to circumvent the provisions of § 610 and that the 
fund constituted union money." 434 F. 2d, at 1121. 
3 It has been an ancient and cardinal tenet of statutory construc--
t ion that "where a law is expressed in plain and unambiguous terms, 
whether those terms are general or limited, the legislature should be 
intended to mean what they have plainly expressed, and consequently 
no room is left for statutory construction." Lake County v. Rollins, 
130 U. S. 662, 670 (1889); Yat es v. United States, 354 U. S. 298, 
305 (1957); United States v. Standard Brewery, 251 U. S. 210, 21T 
(1920). 
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It is not normally the function of this Court in a case 
of this kind to determine ,vhether a jury verdict is sup-
ported by substantial evidence. It may not be inap-
propriate, however, to say-in light of the record before 
us-that the evidence was more than sufficient to show 
that union officials supervised closely the collection of 
the "contributions," sought "contributions" in much the 
same manner as compulsory assessments, viewed them as 
part of the total cost burden which the union member 
had to bear, expended them freely both for union projects 
and political purposes, and so generally commingled the 
administration of the Fund with the administration of 
the union as to entitle the jury to believe the gifts by 
Local 562 from the fund to candidates for federal office 
constituted union political contributions in violation of 
§ 610. 4 
The majority opinion of this Court does not contest 
this view. It concludes, rather, that the jury was er-
roneously instructed, and that accordingly the verdict and 
judgment must be set aside. If a new trial is held the 
jury must be instructed in accordance with the Court's 
interpretation of § 610 that a union may lawfully make 
political contributions from a fund it collects and admin-
isters so long as the payments into it are voluntary. 
It is from this interpretation of § 610-one which in 
4 E,·en on the issue of Yoluntariness, \\·hi.ch the Court of Appe;1 ls 
rightly found "relcYill1t and material" though "not controlling," 434 
F. 2d, at-, the evidrnce was impressive that the collection scheme 
w;1 s inherently coercive. Since Local 562 had consistent ly collected 
contributions to its political funds since 1949, "contributions" appear 
to h:n-e become a customary de facto condition to union membership 
or employment within Local 562's jurisdiction. MoreO\-cr, the regu-
larity of these contributions-week-by-week and year-by-~·ear ;1nd 
each in the same amount as requested by the union-seems suspi-
ciously incompatible with the concept of free will gifts. 
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my view will render the statute largely ineffectual-that 
I dissent. 5 
III 
The consequences of today's decision could be far-
reaching indeed. The opinion of the Court provides a 
blueprint for compliance with § 610, as now construed, 
which will be welcomed by every corporation and union 
which wishes to take advantage of a heretofore unrecog-
nized opportunity to influence elections in this country.r. 
5 My interpretation of the statute docs not imply that no "separate 
fund" would be permissible. I recognize that , consistently with the 
statute (as amended by § 205), a union or corporation may be instru-
mental in establishing a politicH l fund , provided it is a bona fide 
one--separate and segregated from the union in a genuine, not merely 
fo rmalistic way. For exnmple, E>uch a fund might be managed by a 
separate corporate nonprofi t entity, "·ith responsible trustees not 
,:ubserYient to the union or corporate sponsor, who engage inde-
pendent auditors, who make regular reports to cont ributors, and who 
provide realistic means by which contributors can express their 
preference as to political candidat es or parties. Safeguards would 
be required to assure that cont ributions were not coerced, either di-
rectly or by means of an inherently coercive system or relationship . 
Such a bona fide fund would contrast quite sharply wit h that operated 
by Local 562, where there were no by-laws, no constitution, no inde-
pendent trustees, no audit , no report to contributors, or other indica-
t ions of genuine separateness or segregation ; and where the union 
itself collected, operated and expended the "contributions" in sub-
stantially the same manner as union dues and assessments. 
6 I recognize, of course, that the recent enactment of § 205 of the 
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 has supplemented and ex-
tended § 610 in defining permissible limits of union and corporate 
contribut ions. But § 205 still leaYes intact t he operative language 
of § 610 which explicitly proscribes political cont ribut ions by unions 
nnd corporations. The interpretative gloss todny added unnecessa rily 
on this language will result in rendering ineffectual the basic intention 
of the Congress to prevent the intrusion of corporate nnd union 
power into our political system. 
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It may be that the unions, by virtue of a system of 
collecting "political contributions" simultaneously ·with 
the collection of dues and regularlizing such collections 
to the point where they are indistinguishable from dues, 
will be the primary beneficiaries. But the corporations 
are more numerous than the unions. They have millions 
of stockholders and hundreds of thousands of nonunion 
employees. Both unions and corporations have large 
financial resources. Today's interpretation of § 610 ·will 
enable a more direct and extensive political employment 
of these resources by both union and corporation. 
By refusing to affirm the judgment below, the majority 
renders the ultimate fate of this litigation uncertain. If, 
on remand, the techniques of Local 562 should be sanc-
tioned, other unions and corporations could easily follow 
Local 562 and obtain from members, employees and 
shareholders a consent form attesting that the contribu-
tion ( or withholding) is "voluntary." The trappings of 
voluntariness might be achieved while the substance of 
coercion remained. Union members and corporate em-
ployees might find themselves the objects of regular and 
systematized solicitation by the very agent which exer-
cised direct control over their jobs and livelihood. 
The only remaining requirement to meet the new 
standards is that the fund be separate from other union 
or corporate funds, although under the majority's in-
terpretation of § 205 it may be established, administered 
and the contributions to it solicited by the union or cor-
poration with their own funds. Again, if Local 562 were 
to provide the standards, the separateness of such a fund 
need be nothing more than separate ledger and bank 
accounts. 
In sum, the opinion of the Court today, adopting an 
interpretation of § 610 at variance with its language and 
purpose, goes a long way toward returning unions and 
corporations to an unregulated status with respect to-
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political contributions. This opening of the door to ex-
tensive corporate and union influence of the elective and 
legislative processes must be viewed with genuine con-
cern. This seems to me to be a regressive step as con-
trasted with the numerous legislative and judicial actions 
in recent years designed to assure that elections are in--
deed free and representative. 
I would affirm the judgment below. 
- MEMORANDUM 
TO: Mr. Larry A. Hammood DATE: May 22, 1972 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
No. 70-74 Pipefltters 
Do you have the copy of Justice Brennan's opinion on which I 
made a number of marginal notes? 
If so, I would like to borrow it. 
L. F. P., Jr. 
- May 28, 1972 
Re: No. 70-74 Pipefitters v. U.S. 
Dear Bill: 
In reviewing my files, I believe that I have not advised you 
as to my position in Pipefitters. 
Although your analysis of the legislative history is a most 
impressive and commendable work of scholarship, I remain un-
convinced that the statute must be construed to allow unions and 
corporations to participate directly in politics. 
Accordingly, I plan to write a brief dissent. 
Mr. ,Justice Breanan 




TO: Mr. J. Harvie Wilkinson, m DATE: June 2, 1972 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
No. 70-71 Pipefitters 
I am leaving on your desk a file folder with my draft of a 
dissenting opinion. 
In view of Larry's other commitments, I would appreciate 
your working with me an this dissent. It will be necessary, of course, 
for you to take a look at the opinions below, but your primary attention -
in preparation for reviewing my draft - should be a close reading of 
Mr. Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court. 
He construes the statute primarily on the basis of an elaborate 
examination of the legislative history. He makes an impressive case 
an this basis. But it seems to me that the words of the statute are 
controlling, and that they afford no support whatever for Justice 
Brennan's ccmclusion as to what the statute means. Moreover, going 
back to the 1907 Corrupt Practices Act, the purpose of this statute 
has been to keep corporations and unions out of politics. This purpose 
will be frustrated by the Court's interpretation. 
In reviewing my own draft, please keep in mind that I want to 
portray fairly the position of the Brennan opinion. 
L. F. P., Jr. 
cc: Mr. Larry A. Hammond 
I have now reviewed Pipefitters and thought the best thing 
to do would be to write you a memo expressing what I think are 
the problems with the opinion . i We could then discuss them and 
get the benefits of each others' thoughts and views and~ 
decide in what direction to proceed o 
I m~stx believe very stxE~i strongly that the Miews policy 
views you expressi in the opinion are the correct ones and ones 
in which I deeply believe . Unions have long enjoyed a poiition 
of singul@r privilege under our election laws and this entire 
case highlights just how gross this ~xExprivilege is o Moreover, 
I agree with you that the majority deicsion leaves unions wit~ 
axfxeexa~ (and to a lesser extent corporations) with a free hand 
to continue their influence unabated o The restriction of 
voluntariness imposed by the majority is , as you point out, really 
no restriction at all . If union officials are allowed to collect 
.. 
the fi funds and to finance the sollicitation from union treasuries 
they will easily find a way to present the trappinijs of ~Eu 
voluntariness and t~is t~iM thus evade the whole intent of these ia 
laws . iEXJt!XE~iillit 
Believing as strongly as I do in the policy position you 
have articulated, I was nonetheless forced to conclude that I 
have deep legal misgivings about the opinion which run counter 
to my political prejudices. To put the matter most bluntly , as 
things stand now , I am afraid Brennan has us beat . Nor do I 
believe the opinion as it now stands , fairly meets the Brennan 
position on legal grounds despite the fact that the policy position 




My xes reasons are as follows: 
(1) On page 14 you contrast 
with the Court's holding. 0~xt~ext~isxia~~~a~ 
the totality of the picture I would think 
correct one. Even so, the language is not 
this language 
not necessarily include the individual, voluntary decision 
the individual members to contribute to a political 
totality of these "voluntary" collections would not invariably ~-~~  
~ ~ constitute the contribution of a labor Ex~ai~ organization. It I 
~  could be said this was the voluntary contribution of some of the f/o 
!V- -,,,,,--~ 
~ ~members and not of the Ex~a~i union itself. Now this may not 




tthink yours is most ~XEEaixprobably EEXXRG correct. But I am 
~~ ~~~~ persuaded that the language on this point is so 100% clear as 7 
,_Jo,; . to make an examination of the legislative history unnecessary. 
r. ~-
~~ ~ ~-
ME even more disheartening about our legal 
f<>-; '~ 
that our opinion as it now stands ,M}1s utterly to 
_,, 
~~ 
deal fairly with Brennan's comments on~ section 205 of the Federal 
~- Campaign Election Act. The comments on page 18 of our dissent 
simply do not address Brennan's very substantial points on this 
issue(see pages 23 thru 25 of i his opinion and 36 thru 40). {he 
portion of the holding with respect to 205 which you quote siM~i¥ 
EEesx~Et in the text on page 18 is not really relevant to the 
points in Brennan's opinion which we have to combat. ~Ewx The 
central question for us is this: Howe do we come to grips with the 
~ follwoinij language in 205: 
~ ~ _ie~ i~~ The phrase contribution or expenditure shall not 
'1-~-~~ :~~ include the establishment, administration, and sollicitation 
~~ ~ontributions to a separate, sei segregated fund to be 
4,-o ~ilized for political purposes by a E~ corporation or 
--~ ~~bor arganizatio~•••• 
~~~~~· 
~ j~1- L,, L._~)U~-.,..e..~11"o-(..~ -~·~ t-:- r  ~ r -- ~.,.,,.. .. , .s: ~1 I Tr hese words seem to me eX181:SEXikle expressl;kermi t the very 




any rate, I feel the iaE failure to deal with the ~Ei~t language 
and the very impressive history Brennan has erected to support 
W.e,~h.d 
it constitue a serious shortcoming of our dissent. -:;:i.J,,,n.•:.ti. n,1,,,1 
~ 
tot~ (3) I consider it ie~sxsMiEiee legal suiside 
EE~ta contradict Brennan's view without a single quote from 
~ member of Congress which says that voluntary contributions 
of members to a union political fund are proscribed. In fact, quite 
~~ ~¥)/ a lot of members of iE~~x ~k ~E~f Congress say that such funds 
~4.;,-'re ~xp~ly permitted, even the most conservative members w~• 
~~ 40 ~ union financed opponents must be an anathema. Larry's 
o'\ ~~ research seems to indicate that this type of ~EiM~aax¥ union fund 
~A:,.. / 
 ~ ~ as never broughi!} into dispute b~ any member of Congress. At any 
we cannot go against Brennan effectioely without any showing 
any member of Congress that sM~XM~iE~ voluntary contributions 
union fund were in doubt when Brennan has quoted massively 
all shades of opinion in the /Congress showing that such funds 
~exMitx contemplated as permissible. 
(4) We a~~exMttexi~ fail also to deal with another point w~i 
which is crucial to Brennan's presentation. On pages 31-35 Brennan 
discusses PAC a~~xits for a long time the political arm of the 
~ A CIOo Ra PAC as you know is has always been utterly entertwined 
i ~g/ with the administration of the CID, though they have adhered to 
. :v ,,_,' 
~?~"voluntariness" concept iJo at least in form. But throughout 
~ ..-~ this entire seri~~ enactments, from Taft-Hartl¥Y to the 
;.,J .µ -;,f ederal E ti~~ampaign Act, PAC remained in operation with the f 
full a of members of Congress and ~xagitg pracitically 
• />~veryone else in the E country.~ I do not see how PAC WE could hav 
~ q, 
~ ,# operated unless the various enactm e nts in t h i s case had recognized 
~ f\ c.. 
~b._;f-~ d >-(; ~ 4C...., ~ : ~ «--,_, ~ 
"'k~~..,J..,.~~ ~J1.c,..+et- ,-0 Av~~~~ ~ 
C,,;t;-~~ CN t.« ~ ~ ~ V"f t"'44.~ , ._;_,_ ~ ~ w• _,._..-1 
its validwty. At any rate, the failure of the opinionlto address L 
~ .... A..,~~ 
systematically a point of which the majority mak ~iE places such 
emphasis is yet a~EXX another difficulty. 
(5) On page 2~xEfxt~e 20 of the opinion you say that 
" the evidence of this lack of l_!le~i: genuine voluntariness is so 
overwhelming as to require affirmance of the conviction without 
regard to other issues." You then at various points in the opinion 
point out the very legitimate EE~si:~exati:E~s factors which E~e 
would lead one to conclude that the scheme lacked voluntariness. 
think your conclusions from the evidence is correct. iex There 
competing considerations, i.eo that donations to the j 
necessary for union membership, that donors sighed 
the voluntariness of the contributions, 
donations, and that certain 
in contributed. Still, I think your conclusic 
the correct oneo But- the point to me seems to be that it is not yoL 
.L who should be weighing this evidence, but the jury, This whole 
),,0 ~.-Jase had not fEE~se~xE~ made voluntariness the focal point of 
~ ~ the trial and it is unfair to say we can affirm a conviction on 
~ ~a ~•k grounds which was never submitted in the same fxa~ frmaework 
'4 !,.o ~to the jury. This is a criminal conviction carrying prison sentence, 
~ :ef::::::sn::et:n:i::~:l::i:nt;::: :: un::•t::ee::::::: 
Ai-'-~--- ~arts their conviction i~ i~xa on a ch mx was never 
, ~ submitted as the focal issue to the jury. ,,, 
Two more minmr points: I as a matter of a fairness 
and the corporation in you that you 
opiniono But this is that hits basically at union power. 
~ ~ ~ ~~ Tu..~ 
~ ~~)~~~~) ~ 
 ~ ~ -~-.~A,~ 
After 
~ ..L:Jc. • .- ~ ~ ~-~ ~' 
~ --~ ~-~~c:!!i.2 ~ :.: .r:::::..:t-
all, the corporations have not been prospering from voluntary 
corporate political funds in the past~ the way unions haveo I 
think there is a danger in people reading the union corporation 
linkages with a "who's he trying to kid" attitude" I must say that 
I find all the ai analogies to corporate shareholders utterly 
inapposite. No corporation ~aE has anything like the job or pay -leverage with its shareholders the way a union has with its members, 
j~ 
• 1?-- :u::n e:::e:e::a:i: ::::: ::m::r B:a:m:e:::s~:: ::: :::e s:::o:::::ny• 
~ flam0:t ~ .t., ~~ 
4>-. ~ In ,addition, corporate shareholders ge erally represeOO a ~j 
~i~ch more diverse group politically th n union members, w~~ 
~ ~ l Qallegiances trend more tlo to the Democ party though I agree 
0 
< ~ o invaribly so. further, what shareholder in anything other than 
¥1.-
• the most closely held corporation is goi g to let management of 
directors take a share of his dividends¥ 
This is to invite ax~XRE EHXiE derivative suites, p 
bad publicity and sell outs. In short, 
A lot 
.. 




o much belaborment of factual material, much of which ~vf 
~necsessary. You can organinze the salient facts in a much crisper 
was waaa way ~it~R~t and have them work for you much more e~ ~ 
~L"-•~~~~-"-i"~ 
....,,~ ~1-. ...... ~AA~1,'-f-7~ r---, 
f~ ~ _ r- r-· ~  ~~ ~ ...,41 ··o\al. ~
After all, the corporations have not been prospering from voluntc 
corporate political funds in the past~ the way unions have. I 
think there is a danger in people reading the union corporation 
linkages with a "who's he trying to kid" attitude. I must say the 
I find all the ax analogies to corporate shareholders utterly 
inapposite. No corporation ~aE has anything like the job or pay -
leverage with its shareholders the way a union has with its membE 
A man can sell his stock if he ~i EEE doesn't iim like the compar Cj~ --~~ M,........,- much easier that a union member can leave his job and seniority. 
~ I~m~i ~ ~ ,..,.,JL.,..,;,,-, 
~-~ In ,addition, corporate shareholders ge erally represebb a~ 
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0 
<(' ~ o invaribly so. further, what shareholder in anything other the 
~1,. 
• the most closely held corporation is goi g to let management of 
directors take a share of his dividends¥ 
This is to invite ax~xEE EexiE derivative suites, p 
bad publicity and sell outs. In short, 
threat 
o much belaborment of factual material, much of which~ 
~necsessary. You can organinze the salient facts in a much eris~ 
was ~aaa way ~it~EMi and have them work for you much more e» ~ 
effectively. As it i 
. I -r w:L- 0-,4.;::::t 
~ ~~~~~ 
the opinion is marrednyt~e long 
factual recitations both at the beginning of the opinion and 
from page 20~ on. 
to being a repeat 
facts but it needs to 
seem to remember came very close 
I k~EB know why you're using the 
In conclusion, I serious misgivings 
about the opinion in its present • My feeling is that the 
Brennan case is convincing for the rea I ~a»g expressed in 
points one thru fouro I find the policy of 
that position as distasteful as do you but rewrite 
the statute and the overwhelming weight of the 
is for Congress to do, though given union power ther , I 
doubt it will soon come about. It may be that there ar 
constitutional defects in the ~x si present statutory scH 
w~E which gives unions this position which violate the 
This 
~V interpretation we cannot proceed against~ Brennan opinion 
~ without a better case than we a ¥BX ~ a have nowo Taht is 
;~ why we need to di cuss this, afrai9 Brennan's 
~ • makes an awful ~dtuory case thee reform of st 
~ ~ ~r~~s. / tJ 0 
~ ~~~ ~TION1 Y0 ~ might think about a brief concurrence • '~~ ~ r could talk about the pie policy problems you so iezge 
~ t# ~k EB forcefully articulate and drop a few hints that i~e~ the ,, ~ 
qt" ... : ·.~ present schwme of ii things seems constituftionally defective) Y,,:... p cs$, I~ .,....Je r +I.. jsr /J-.re J-. I ~ 
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• MEMORANDUM 
TO: Mr. J. Harvie Wilkinson, III DATE: June 15, 1972 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Y/ ~ '7 i 
Pipefitters 
Here is a checklist of the things you and I discussed with 
respect to the revised draft: 
1. You will add in Section 1 the material and the citations 
(the CIO case) with respect to the purpose of § 610 - material which 
was in Section III of your draft. It may be possible for you to condense 
this somewhat, although I think it adds strength to our basic position 
as to the correct meaning of § 610. 
2. We are still not satisfied with the citations as to the 
irrelevance of legislative history if the words of a statute are clear 
and unambiguous. In addition to taking a look at the Supreme Court 
Digest, there should be one or more textbooks in the library on 
legislation, statutes, and rules of construction. What we need is a 
case which says explicitly that legislative history cannot alter or 
enlarge precisely and specific statutory language. 
3. I still hope you will take a look at the Senate Committee 
Report on the 1947 legislation. Do not hesitate to ask one of the 
2. 
librarians to help you find this. That is what they are paid to do. 
4. The draft opinion, as it now stands, may convey the 
impression that no "separate fund" is permissible under our inter-
pretation of the statute. It is therefore important to add a carefully 
drafted footnote. This should indicate that we recognize, of course, 
that it is possible, consistent with the statute, for a union or a corpora-
tion to be instrumental in establishing a political fund provided ih is 
a bona fide one - actually separate and segregated from the union 
realistically and not merely formalistically. You might say in the 
note, for example, that such a fund could be managed by a separate 
corporate nonprofit entity, with responsible trustees, who engage independent 
auditors, who make reports to contributors, and who provide means 
by which contributors can express their preference as to political 
candidates or _parties. ~1n addition, contributions to such a fund must 
be genuinely voluntary and not the product of some inherently coercive 
system. This note can be dramatized by contrasting a bond fide fund 
with the type of fund operated by Local 562. Here, you can put in 
the note all of the language dealing with the fictitous nature of 562's 
fund - that is no constitution, no by-laws, no trustees, no audit, no 
report to contributors, etc. 
L. F. P., Jr. 
June 16, 1972 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: 70-74 Pipefitters v. U. s. 
In view of the pressure on the print shop, I am circulating 
herewith xerox c q,ies of my long-promised dissent in the above case. 
I owe Bill Brennan an apology for this delay, as I am sure 
that it bas inconvenienced him as well as held up final action on 
this case. 
L. F. P., Jr. 
- CHAMBERS OF 
.:§npumt ~o-nrl af tlrt ~t~ ,jmug 
'Ji[rulirittghm. ~ . ~- 2!1ffe~.$ 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST 
June 19, 1972 
Re: No. 70-74 - Pipefitters v. U.S . 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me in your opinion in this case. 
Sincerely , 
.1 11 ( )/'11/"'' 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Conference 
- - 'IU-'14 
THE C. J. W. 0. D. W. J.B. P. S. B. R. W. T. M. H. A. B. L. F. P . W. H. R. 
- 1 /?.5/72 
,.1_-,._ ,.._ ,I, 
r ·~ 
J.,·· ·~·~D ~ \pi> agree with . ~- ..... , wY~1 W'JB memo ~c;~ 3/20/72 
;h/~✓ ,;,/2,.,. 
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